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Abstract 
When integrating new information into our beliefs, an important factor is valence: whether 
a piece of news is good or bad. Evidence suggests that for self-relevant beliefs, separate 
rules and mechanisms underlie integration of these different types of news with good news 
being integrated to a greater degree than bad news. This asymmetry results in a positive 
bias. In this thesis, I present 4 studies that explore the boundaries of this asymmetry.  
In study 1, I explore how the asymmetry is altered in clinical depression. I show that 
depressed patients update beliefs regarding their future in response to bad news to a greater 
degree than healthy controls resulting in unbiased updating. fMRI results suggest that this 
increased capacity to integrate bad news is the result of greater responsiveness in the receipt 
of undesirable information. These findings suggest that a positive state of mental health is 
linked to biased processing of information that supports positively skewed views of the 
future. In study 2, I examine whether the asymmetry varies in response to changes in the 
environment. Two separate experiments show that information integration in response to 
bad news (but not good news) is enhanced in threatening environments. These findings 
suggest that biased processing of information is not set in stone, but flexibly changes in 
response to the environment. In study 3, I adapt the update bias paradigm to investigate if a 
positive update bias exists under an alternative method of classifying good and bad news. A 
positive update bias remains under this alternative classification. In addition, under both the 
original and this alternative method of classification, updating is shown to correspond more 
closely to a rational Bayesian agent for good compared to bad news. These findings suggest 
that the update bias is robust to variations in classification schemes and analysis. In study 4, 
I explore whether an asymmetry in updating exists for positive as well as for negative life 
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events. I show that participants update their beliefs to a greater extent when receiving good 
news compared to bad news, regardless of whether the information concerns a positive or a 
negative life event. These findings suggest that the bias is not a phenomenon specific to 
negative life events and is robust to variations in task stimuli. Taken together with the 
findings of study 3, the results make a strong case for a true optimistic asymmetry in belief 
updating. 
The four studies presented in this thesis expand our knowledge of how individuals 
integrate information about the world, characterize the boundaries of asymmetric 
information integration, examine the neural mechanisms that support it and its 
responsiveness to environmental threat.  
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
 
1.1 Information integration and biased beliefs 
How do individuals integrate new information into beliefs about themselves and their 
future? The fact that beliefs of these kind show a tendency to be biased in a positive 
direction suggests that valence is an important factor. When individuals consider their 
skills and abilities, for instance, most exhibit a superiority illusion (Brown, 1986; 
Hoorens, 1993; Kruger and Dunning, 1999; Meyer, 1975; Svenson, 1981), believing they 
are better and more skilled than the majority. When thinking about one’s future, the 
majority of people exhibit unrealistic optimism (Armor and Taylor, 2002; Baker and 
Emery, 1993; Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003; Puri and Robinson, 2007; Sharot, 2011; 
Weinstein, 1980). This means that they underestimate the likelihood of negative life 
events and overestimate the likelihood of positive events occurring. One of the first 
studies to demonstrate this phenomenon presented college students with different positive 
(for instance: receiving an award, living past 80) and negative (for instance: having a heart 
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attack, divorced a few years after marriage) life events and asked the students to estimate 
their own likelihood relative to the average of their peers (Weinstein, 1980). The students 
rated themselves as more likely than average to experience positive events (for example 
13% more likely to receive an award) and less likely than average to experience negative 
events (for example, 49% less likely to become divorced) (Weinstein, 1980).  
Intuitively it may seem odd that beliefs are positively biased in this way. After all, 
in daily life, we encounter information and experiences that ought to cause beliefs to 
reflect an accurate representation of the world in which we live. The fact that beliefs are 
positively biased suggests that information is integrated to a greater degree when 
information represents good news compared to when it is represents bad news. Indeed, 
whilst theories from economics (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953), machine learning 
(Bishop, 2006; Russell and Norvig, 1995) and psychology (Körding and Wolpert, 2006; 
Maslow, 1950) conceive of humans as rational unbiased integrators of information, 
experimental evidence suggests that this is not the case when it comes to self-relevant 
beliefs. In these instances, evidence suggests that bad news is often underweighted relative 
to good news. This is observed when participants are presented with information 
concerning their character traits (Korn et al., 2012), attractiveness (Eil and Rao, 2011), 
intellect (Eil and Rao, 2011; Mobius et al., 2012), financial prospects (Wiswall and Zafar, 
2015) and likelihood of experiencing aversive life events in the future (Sharot et al., 
2011). In each of these instances, beliefs are updated to a greater degree when this 
information suggests a shift to a more desirable set of beliefs (i.e. good news) relative to 
when this information suggests a shift to a less desirable set of beliefs (i.e. bad news).  
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In one study (Eil and Rao, 2011), groups of participants undertook a series of brief 
“dates” with one another and then rated each other on an attractiveness scale. Ratings were 
used to compile a ranking of the most attractive to the least attractive in the group. Each 
participant was then asked to plot a histogram that represented their perceived likelihood 
of being rated at each position in the ranking from most attractive in the group (position 1) 
to the least attractive in the group (position 10). On each trial, participants were then told 
whether their overall rank was above or below another randomly selected anonymous 
participant. Hence participants could get good news (someone else in the group was rated 
less attractive than them) or bad news (someone else in the group was rated more 
attractive than them). Participants were then asked to redraw their belief histogram. 
Comparing participants’ posteriors to those of a Bayesian agent showed that following 
good news, subjects updated their beliefs in a normative, Bayesian, manner (R2, 
accounting for subjects’ posterior with a Bayesian posterior, approximately 0.8), but less 
so following receipt of bad news (R2 approximately 0.5).  
In another study (Mobius et al., 2012), participants (n >2000) undertook an IQ test 
and then estimated the likelihood that they were in the top half of performers. After each 
estimate they received a noisy signal (correct with 75% probability) informing them 
whether they were in the top or bottom half of performers. They then re-estimated the 
likelihood that they were in the top half of performers. Participants’ posteriors were more 
similar to that of a Bayesian agent following receipt of good news than bad news, 
(although in general their updates were more conservative than a Bayesian).  
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1.2 Update Bias Task and information integration 
Another type of belief updating in which asymmetry in information integration is 
observed concerns beliefs about the likelihood of future life events. This has been 
quantified using the Update Bias Task (UBT) (Figure 1.1 and Experimental Methods, 
Chapter 2). The basic premise of the task is to elicit people’s beliefs about the likelihood 
of different events occurring to them, provide them with information that is either better or 
worse than expected and then examine how these beliefs change in light of this 
information. 
 
Figure 1.1: The Update Bias Task. Participants are presented with approximately 80 
different aversive life events and are asked to estimate their likelihood of experiencing each 
event. They are then presented with the average likelihood of the event occurring to 
someone like them and are asked to re-estimate their likelihood. This is used to test and 
quantify asymmetric belief updating. Displayed (top) is an example of a good news trial in 
which the average likelihood is lower than the participant’s first estimate and (bottom) an 
example of a bad news trial in which the average likelihood is higher than the participant’s 
first estimate. 
 
In the UBT, participants estimate the likelihood of experiencing different aversive 
life events in the future and are then presented with the average likelihood of these events 
happening to someone from the same socio-economic environment as them. Trials are 
partitioned into trials where participants receive good news in which the average presented 
is lower than their first estimate and bad news in which the average likelihood is higher 
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than their initial estimate. In a second session, participants see all aversive life events 
again and are asked to re-estimate their own likelihood of experiencing each event in the 
future. By comparing participant’s first and second estimates, the extent to which 
participants update their estimates following presentation of the information provided (i.e. 
the change from first to second estimates) can be quantified and compared for good news 
trials and bad news trials. The finding from a range of studies (Chowdhury et al., 2014; 
Garrett et al., 2014; Garrett and Sharot, 2014; Korn et al., 2013; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 
2016; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a, 2012b) is that updating is asymmetric, being greater for 
good news compared to bad news (Figure 1.2a).  
This task has also been adapted to examine how social information is integrated 
and whether valence also plays a role in the context of updating beliefs about one’s 
abilities and character traits (Korn et al., 2012). Participants played a game of monopoly 
in groups of 5 and then privately rated one another according to different trait adjectives 
(e.g., polite, pedantic, reliable, selfish). Then a version of the UBT was administered in 
which participants rated themselves on each trait and saw the group’s mean rating of them 
on this trait. As in the original UBT (Sharot et al., 2011), participants can get good (group 
gives them a higher rating on a positive trait or a lower rating on a negative trait) or bad 
(group gives them a lower rating on a positive trait or a higher rating on a negative trait) 
news. In a second session, participants then rated themselves again on each trait. The 
results showed that participants changed their ratings more when receiving good news 
compared to when in receipt of bad news (Korn et al., 2012).  
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1.3 Underlying mechanism of biased updating 
1.3.1 Memory, stimulus properties and skewed priors 
The asymmetric updating pattern observed in the UBT (Figure 1.2a) cannot be accounted 
for by memory differences. In the original study (Sharot et al., 2011), this was examined 
by asking participants to try and recall each of the probabilities they were presented with 
during the UBT, immediately after completing the task. There were no significant 
differences in memory errors (calculated as the absolute difference between participants 
recall of probabilities and the actual probabilities) for good news trials and bad news trials 
(Sharot et al., 2011). This was tested by calculating mean memory errors for good news 
and bad news trials for each participant and comparing these two sets of errors using 
paired sample ttests.  
The pattern of asymmetric updating could also not be explained by differences in 
subjective properties of the stimuli, specifically: emotional arousal, familiarity, vividness, 
extent of negative valance and past experience. This was tested by having participants rate 
each life event according to each of these properties on a 6 point likert scale after 
completion of the UBT. Difference scores (calculated as the difference between the 
average rating for good news trials and average rating for bad news trials) were calculated 
for each participant for each of the subjective properties. When these 5 sets of difference 
scores were entered as covariates in a repeated measures ANOVA comparing belief 
updating for good news and bad news trials, the difference in updating between good and 
bad news remained significant (Sharot et al., 2011). Note that asymmetric updating also 
cannot be explained as the result of differential processing of high and low numbers as 
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this was controlled for by asking participants to estimate their likelihood of encountering 
adverse events on half of the trials and to estimate their likelihood of not encountering the 
adverse events on the other half of the trials (Sharot et al., 2011). 
One possibility though is that biased updating is the result of positively skewed 
priors held by participants. Care is taken to control for the mean prior of participants in the 
UBT (by adding average first estimate as a covariate in the analysis) but the distribution 
of priors this mean is generated from cannot be inferred from the task so it is not possible 
to know whether these are positively skewed. However, studies that have elicited a full 
distribution of participants’ prior beliefs such as those described above (Eil and Rao, 
2011; Mobius et al., 2012) show that their posteriors diverge significantly from what 
would be expected from a Bayesian agent following bad news, but converge with 
Bayesian posteriors following good news. Here, although participants are shown to place 
full weights on their priors, they still underweight bad news relative to good news even 
when incentivized to report accurate beliefs. 
1.3.2 Reinforcement learning 
Reinforcement learning originated in the field of machine learning (Sutton and Barto, 
1998) to describe a class of problems in which, over multiple trials, an agent is tasked with 
learning which action it should take (for instance, which of two buttons to press, with each 
button leading to rewards with differing probabilities) in order to achieve a goal (for 
instance, maximising rewards).  
One simple mechanism (sometimes referred to as a type of “model free” learning) 
by which agents are able to learn in these types of contexts is to assign values to each 
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available action and iteratively scale these values up and down according to how well they 
correspond to actual outcomes that ensue when a specific action is selected. “Prediction 
Errors” (β) quantify this difference between expected and actual rewards (Schultz et al., 
1997; Sutton and Barto, 1998). Formally, on a specific trial (t), a prediction error (β) for 
an action, A, selected on that trial, can be expressed as: 
β(t) = r(t) - VA(t) 
Where, r(t) represents the reward delivered on the current trial t and VA(t) the expected 
value of action A. 
Prediction errors are therefore positive in instances in which rewards are greater 
than expected (for instance, the delivery of a reward where none was expected) and 
negative in instances in which rewards are less than expected (for instance, the absence of 
a reward where a reward was expected). Prediction errors are then used to increment or 
decrement values assigned to actions, according to a learning rate alpha (α). The value of a 
particular action, A, could be adjusted according to:  
VA(t+1) = VA(t) + α*β(t) 
Hence, the greater the learning rate (α) is, the more that values assigned to actions are 
altered following receipt of feedback (e.g., reward/no reward) on each trial. Where 
multiple actions are possible (e.g., participant needs to choose between actions A and B), 
the values of each action are compared at the time of choice and a choice determined 
stochastically (e.g., via a softmax function) such that actions with higher values are more 
likely to be selected.  
 This simple learning mechanism (e.g., McClure et al., 2003; Pessiglione et al,. 
2006; Frank et al., 2007) and more complex versions of it (e.g., Collins and Frank, 2014) 
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has been shown to perform well at simulating trial by trial learning of humans and animals 
and to be biologically plausible with phasic firing of midbrain dopamine neurons shown to 
encode prediction errors (Schultz et al., 1997).  
Learning in the UBT differs in a number of ways to learning in the type of tasks 
reinforcement learning models typically capture. Two of the key differences are that in the 
UBT, participants encounter each stimulus (life event) just once during the learning phase 
and do not receive any kind of tangible feedback - such as a reward or punishment – 
following their responses (simply information which can be interpreted in a number of 
different ways). This is different to reinforcement learning tasks where participants 
typically see the same stimuli multiple times and receive clear feedback (such as a reward 
or the absence of a reward) on each trial.  
Despite these differences, adapting the reinforcement learning framework to 
learning in the UBT has been shown to perform well in terms of capturing how 
individuals update beliefs regarding their future and differences in learning following the 
receipt of good and bad news. In particular, a key feature of model free reinforcement 
learning that can be adopted to model learning in the UBT, is that learning takes place by 
means of prediction errors which quantify the difference between expectations 
(anticipating that implementing a certain action - such as a button press in response to a 
cue - will lead to an outcome such as a monetary reward) and the actual outcome that 
transpires (Schultz et al., 1997; Sutton and Barto, 1998). An analogous mechanism has 
been suggested to underwrite learning in the UBT (Garrett et al., 2014; Moutsiana et al., 
2013; Sharot et al., 2011). Specifically, that estimation errors (the difference between 
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initial estimates and information participants are provided with on each trial, Figure 1.1) 
drive participant learning.  
1.3.3 Asymmetry in learning 
Reinforcement learning models which use a single learning rate and do not distinguish 
between positive prediction errors (generated for instance when receiving a reward after 
expecting nothing or after expecting something unpleasant as an outcome) and negative 
prediction errors (generated for instance when receiving an electric shock after expecting 
nothing or after expecting something pleasant such as a reward as an outcome) often 
perform worse at accounting for data compared to models that use two learning rates – 
one for positive prediction errors and one for negative prediction errors. This is despite 
penalising the addition of an extra parameter (Frank et al., 2007; Niv et al., 2012; 
Gershman, 2015; Lefebvre et al., 2016). When two learning parameters1 – one for good 
news (αG) and one for bad news (αB) – are used to predict the degree of belief change (i.e. 
update) in the UBT, good news learning parameters (αG) are revealed to be larger than bad 
news learning parameters (αB) (Figure 1.2b), consistent with the asymmetric pattern of 
updating observed in the task (Figure 1.2a). The implication is that estimation errors 
generated in the receipt of good news are assigned more weight and better integrated 
towards belief revision than estimation errors generated in the receipt of bad news (Sharot 
et al., 2011).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Throughout	   the	   thesis,	   to	   avoid	   confusion	   I	   try	   to	   use	   learning	  parameters	   to	   denote	   the	  weights	  assigned	   to	   good	   news/bad	   news	   estimation	   errors	   towards	   updating	   beliefs	   in	   the	   UBT.	   Learning	  
rates	   is	   used	   to	   refer	   to	   weights	   assigned	   to	   negative/positive	   prediction	   errors	   from	   feedback	  received	  in	  reinforcement	  learning	  tasks.	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Some of the reinforcement learning studies that apply two learning rates similarly 
find that learning rates for positive prediction errors are greater than learning rates for 
negative prediction errors (Frank et al., 2007; Lefebvre et al., 2016). However, this is not 
consistently found and in some instances the reverse asymmetry has been found, i.e. 
learning rates for negative prediction errors are greater than those for positive prediction 
errors (Gershman, 2015; Niv et al., 2012). Attempting to characterise the conditions and 
boundaries under which asymmetric learning is observed may help understand this 
discrepancy.  
1.4 Boundaries of asymmetric updating 
Positively biased asymmetric integration of information is most likely to be observed 
when two conditions are met: information is ambiguous and beliefs are motivated.  
1.4.1 Outcomes open to interpretation 
Information received in the UBT is unconstrained and able to be interpreted in different 
ways. Individuals can distrust the source of the information or downplay why it is that a 
particular instance of bad news ought not to apply to them. For example, on learning that 
one is more likely to have a heart attack than previously thought, individuals can bring to 
mind reasons why this need not require a large belief adjustment (e.g. they keep fit, 
maintain a healthy diet). It is of note that less of a positivity bias is observed when 
individuals update views about their intelligence compared to updating views about 
attractiveness (Eil and Rao, 2011). This might be because intelligence (garnered from an 
IQ test in this study) is more objective than attractiveness hence there is less space for 
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manoeuvring in terms of constructing ways that this information could be suspect (and 
therefore discounted). Similarly when one encounters a positive or negative outcome (as 
in reinforcement learning tasks) such as a financial reward, or an electric shock, the form 
of feedback is explicit and cannot be interpreted as anything other than a reward or a 
shock.  
1.4.2 Motivation 
Beliefs are thought to have value in and of themselves, in the sense that they are 
‘consumed’, with positive beliefs eliciting positive feelings and thus having positive 
utility, and negative beliefs eliciting negative feelings and having negative utility 
(Brunnermeier and Parker, 2004; Loewenstein, 2006). People are thus motivated to 
maintain a positive optimistic view of themselves, their circumstances, and their future, 
and to disregard negative information. By contrast, when there is no intrinsic or external 
advantage for holding a belief, or when the advantage is relatively small, an asymmetry in 
updating may be less apparent.  
A recent study (Cahill, 2015) supports the notion that motivation is a key 
requirement for biased belief updating to take place. Participants spun a gambling wheel 
on each trial and were told that this could be ‘tuned’ to one of two modes: positive mode 
in which the wheel pays out rewards more frequently than it incurs losses; or negative 
mode in which the wheel incurs losses more often than it pays out rewards. After each 
spin of the wheel, participants received feedback in the form of a reward or a loss. 
Following feedback they were asked to indicate which of the two modes they thought the 
wheel was tuned to. Note that both of the above constraints are met: (1) information is 
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ambiguous in relation to the belief. Although the outcome (reward or loss) is 
unambiguous, participants can get a reward when the machine is tuned to negative mode 
and a loss when tuned to positive mode; (2) there is a motivation to maintain the belief 
that the wheel is in positive mode (and move away from the belief that it is in negative 
mode) since participants presumably want to believe that they are going to receive rewards 
more often than they incur losses during the experiment. The results from this study show 
that learning from feedback is biased in a positive direction. Specifically, comparing 
beliefs for the same amount of evidence suggestive of being in positive mode (e.g. a loss 
followed by two reward outcomes) to being in negative mode (e.g. a reward followed by 
two loss outcomes), participants were more inclined to report that they thought the wheel 
was in positive mode than negative mode. This suggests that a bias towards positive 
information is present if the relevant conditions (ambiguity and motivation) are met.  
A subsequent study has also reported asymmetric learning in a reinforcement 
learning task (Lefebvre et al., 2016). In this study, participants were instructed to choose 
between pairs of abstract visual cues and probabilistically received feedback (reward or 
loss/reward omission), learning over the course of the experiment which cue was the 
better option in each pair. Across participants, a model comprising 2 learning rates (one 
for positive prediction errors and one for negative prediction errors) provided a better fit to 
participant’s choices than a model with 1 learning rate and learning rates in the 2 learning 
rate model were greater for positive prediction errors than for negative prediction errors 
(consistent with Frank et al., 2007). In other words, when participants received feedback 
that was better than expected, they updated beliefs to a greater extent relative to when they 
received feedback that was worse than expected. The extent to which a model with two 
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learning rates was a better fit to participant’s choices relative to a model with one learning 
rate was also shown to correlate positively with trait optimism.  
The motivation for asymmetric learning in the context of high level abstract beliefs 
(such as whether we are in a positive mode, or whether we are likely to be robbed in the 
future) is consistent with the idea of positive beliefs generating utility (Brunnermeier and 
Parker, 2004; Loewenstein, 2006). A similar motivation may be a factor behind the 
learning asymmetry found in some reinforcement learning paradigms such as the one 
described above (Lefebvre et al., 2016) and others (Frank et al., 2007). Specifically, if 
individuals derive utility from the belief that they are going to receive rewards from 
certain cues and disutility from the belief that they are going to incur losses from certain 
cues, learning to a greater degree following positive feedback than negative feedback (as 
captured by differences in the magnitude of learning rates) would help to generate beliefs 
which produce these utility gains for individuals. Interestingly however, in these 
reinforcement learning contexts, an asymmetry in learning has been found less 
consistently (e.g., Gershman, 2015; Niv et al., 2012) suggesting that other motivations and 
factors may play a role in determining the relative magnitude of learning rates.  
One of these factors may be the timeframe over which beliefs are held. In the 
UBT, beliefs concern the occurrence of significant life events in one’s lifetime. These 
beliefs are therefore of high importance to the participant and their importance and 
relevance continue to exist outside the context of the UBT experiment. In reinforcement 
learning paradigms however, beliefs usually concern abstract cues (such as fractal 
pictures, symbols or one arm bandits). Beliefs about them (such as whether they are likely 
to pay out small rewards or incur small financial losses) are most likely of less importance 
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to the participant, in part because they have no significance once the experiment has 
finished. The relative advantage therefore to holding positively biased beliefs in 
reinforcement learning studies is often likely to be small relative to in the UBT where 
beliefs concern more impactful stimuli and pertain over a much longer timeframe.  
A second factor that is likely to play a role in reinforcement learning paradigms 
but less so in the UBT is the existence of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984, 
1992). Individuals fear losses more than they derive pleasure from gains. As a result, the 
disutility incurred from losing £1 is greater than the utility generated from gaining £1. In 
reinforcement learning tasks which often involve learning to associate some cues with 
gains and others with losses, loss aversion ought to cause a bias towards learning to a 
greater degree from stimuli which incur losses over those that pay gains (since for the 
same amount lost or gained, subjectively the loss will be greater). These effects could 
interact with or dominate any effect of a positive bias that arises out of utility generated 
from holding beliefs about future rewards and losses.  
 Given the presence of these factors and others, it is likely that positive biases 
where they are found in reinforcement learning processes (Lefebvre et al., 2016; Frank et 
al., 2007) are characterised by different boundaries that those that arise in the context of 
high level beliefs such as those in the UBT.  
1.5 Neural representation of estimation errors  
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has been used to investigate areas of the 
brain which track estimation errors from good news and bad news (Sharot et al., 2011). 
Consistent with the behavioural data suggesting that learning from good news and bad 
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news is better explained by separate learning parameters, Blood Oxygenated Level 
Dependant (BOLD) response has been shown to correlate with the magnitude of 
estimation errors in separate parts of the brain. Specifically, BOLD response in the left 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG) and Medial Frontal Cortex (MFC) correlates positively with 
estimation errors generated from good news (Figure 1.2c) whereas BOLD response in the 
right IFG correlates negatively with estimation errors generated from bad news (Figure 
1.2d). Differences in the extent to which BOLD response correlates with estimation errors 
in the right IFG correlated with the extent to which there was a bias in belief updating 
with greater tracking of negative estimation errors corresponding to less biased updating.  
The fact that these fMRI results are lateralised may shed light on the common and 
the separate underlying cognitive processes engaged in when individuals integrate good 
and bad news respectively. Both the left and right IFG have been suggested to play a role 
in encoding “Bayesian surprise” – the extent to which information deviates from a 
Bayesian posterior in a weather prediction task (d’Acremont et al., 2013) – as well as error 
monitoring (Mitchell et al., 2009), reversal learning (Greening et al., 2011) and the 
encoding of risk prediction errors (d’Acremont et al., 2009). However the right IFG 
specifically has been suggested to play a key role in inhibition (Aron et al., 2004) - such as 
task switching in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Konishi et al., 1998; Aron et al., 
2003) or withholding responses in a Go/No Go task (Konishi et al., 1998) - as well as risk 
aversion (Christopoulos et al., 2009) and processing punishment information (O’Doherty 
et al., 2001).  
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Figure 1.2: (a) In the UBT, participants adjust their beliefs to a greater extent when they 
receive good news (i.e. that a negative event is less likely to occur than expected) compared 
to when they receive bad news (i.e., that a negative event is more likely to occur than 
expected). (b) Learning parameters for good news (αG) are greater than learning parameters 
for bad news (αB). Learning parameters (α) quantify the degree to which estimation errors 
(the difference between the first estimate and the information given, see Figure 1.1) 
correspond to change in beliefs (derived from the equation: second estimate = first estimate 
+ α(estimation error)). (c) Estimation errors for good news correlate with blood oxygenation 
level-dependent (BOLD) signal in the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the medial frontal 
cortex (MFG). (d) Estimation errors for bad news correlate negatively with BOLD response 
in the right IFG. Figure adapted from (Sharot et al., 2011).  
 
Recently, Diffusion Tensor Imaging (DTI) has been used to further investigate the 
neural mechanisms that underlie biased belief updating (Moutsiana et al., 2015). Results 
showed that white matter connectivity (measured as the number of white matter tracts) 
between the left IFG and a number of sub cortical brain regions (specifically: left 
amygdala, putamen, pallidum, hippocampus and thalamus) as well as the left insula 
correlated with asymmetric belief updating with greater connectivity between the left IFG 
and each region associated with a greater bias in updating. This was due to a combination 
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of both greater updating in response to good news and reduced updating in response to 
bad news each correlating with the strength of white matter connectivity. This study 
suggests that asymmetric updating is not due to only frontal lobe function but an 
interaction between frontal regions and sub cortical structures modulating value and 
emotion (Baxter and Murray, 2002; Chang, 2001; LeDoux, 2000; Phelps, 2006). 
Consistent with this, applying Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) to the left IFG 
abolishes the update bias (Sharot et al., 2012a). 
1.6 An adaptive function? 
An important question concerns why it is that humans integrate information in this 
asymmetric way as there seem to be obvious disadvantages to ignoring negative 
information such as underestimating risks. Asymmetric belief updating is suggested to be 
a mechanism which gives rise to positively biased beliefs (Sharot and Garrett, 2016) such 
as over-optimism and over-confidence. These beliefs have been blamed for a host of 
disasters such as war (Johnson, 2009), overly aggressive medical decisions (Paling, 2003), 
ill-preparedness in the face of natural catastrophe (Paton, 2003) and financial collapse 
(Shefrin, 2009). Moreover, positively biased views of the self can lead to error and cost, as 
shown for overconfident CEOs (for review, see Dunning et al., 2004) and overconfident 
stock traders (Barber and Odean, 1999).  
Yet, set against these disadvantages there are also a number of advantages to 
holding positive expectations. These include advantages to physical health suggested by a 
number of epidemiological studies. For example, individuals (n=95,000) with positive 
expectations have been shown to be less likely to develop coronary heart disease over an 8 
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year period  (Tindle et al., 2009). Another study (Scheier et al., 1999) reported that 
patients who had developed heart disease and undergone coronary artery surgery were less 
likely to be re-hospitalized in the 6 months following surgery if they were of an optimistic 
disposition, measured with the Life Orientation Test (a similar finding has been reported 
by Tindle et al., 2012). Other studies have found that lung (Novotny et al., 2010) and 
head/neck (Allison, 2003) cancer patients had better survival rates if they were optimistic, 
all else being equal and that optimism protects older adults against stroke (Kim et al., 
2011). The reason that positive expectations are thought to be associated with better 
physical health is suggested to be twofold (Carver and Scheier, 2014). Firstly, optimists 
are more inclined to proactively engage in measures to safeguard their health such as 
refraining from smoking and taking regular exercise (Gitlay et al., 2007; Steptoe et al. 
2006). Secondly, positive expectations are believed to influence emotional responses to 
distressing experiences. Optimism has been linked to lower cortisol response to stress for 
instance (Jobin et al., 2013). This reduction of stress and anxiety can lead to better 
physical health over time (Taylor and Brown, 1988; Taylor et al., 2000). In addition to the 
health advantages positive expectations has been shown to impart, they are also believed 
to be advantageous in terms of increasing motivation (Carver and Scheier, 2014) including 
improving productivity (Galasso and Simcoe, 2011), persistence (Solberg et al., 2009) and 
encouraging the prioritisation and pursuit of goals (Geers et al., 2009). 
Given that there are seemingly disadvantageous and advantageous aspects to 
positive expectations, one possibility for their survival is that the advantageous aspects 
outweigh the disadvantageous (McKay and Dennett, 2010). Another possibility however, 
suggested by an evolutionary computational model (Johnson and Fowler, 2011), is that 
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populations have evolved over time to be overconfident as this maximises individual 
fitness. This is because individuals successfully claim resources from stronger less 
confident rivals and are resistant to rivals trying to claim resources that they are strong 
enough to defend. Importantly, overconfidence only evolves as an equilibrium in this 
model when 2 conditions are met: (1) there is uncertainty about one anothers capability in 
attaining resources; (2) resources attainable from conflicts need to be sufficiently greater 
than costs incurred in conflicts. Interestingly, when this second assumption is not met and 
attainable resources are lower than the costs of conflict, the dynamics of the model play 
out such that a combination of unbiased and underconfident individuals evolves as the 
equilibrium. This raises the suggestion that when costs in the environment increase 
relative to rewards, a reduction of positive expectations ought to be observed. This idea is 
tested in Chapter 4 where I examine whether positively biased updating remains when an 
individuals environment becomes more threatening. 
Animal studies investigating positive expectations consistently show that in 
environments that are comfortable and/or rich in resources, positive expectations are 
present but these expectations are absent in environments which are unpleasant, 
threatening and/or depleted. This has been observed in pigs (Douglas et al., 2012), chicks 
(Salmeto et al., 2011), rodents (Harding et al., 2004) and starlings (Matheson et al., 2008). 
Studies typically have animals associate a response to a cue (such as a sound, visual cue or 
odour) with an appetitive outcome and an alternate response to a contrasting cue with a 
less appetitive or aversive outcome. A novel intermediate cue is then introduced and it is 
observed whether the animals response is suggestive that the better or worse outcome is 
expected.  
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In one study (Matheson et al., 2008), starlings learned stimulus (visual cue of a 
specific duration) response (pecking one of two buttons) associations to two different 
visual cues (e.g. short, 2 seconds and long, 10 seconds). A correct response to one of the 
visual cues led to a high reward (immediate food) and an alternate response to the other 
visual cue led to a low reward (delayed food). Incorrect responses were not rewarded. 
After stimulus-response associations had been learned, an intermediate visual cue (e.g. 
medium, 6 seconds) was introduced. Animal responses to this cue indicated whether they 
expected this to lead to the high reward or low reward. Starlings housed in comfortable 
environments (large cages with natural branches and water baths) showed a higher 
tendency to expect intermediary cues to lead to high rewards relative to starlings housed in 
unenriched environments (smaller cages with unpredictable cleaning times, water baths 
50% of the time). Other studies have reported similar results in different species using 
variations of this paradigm, including the use of one reward and one aversive outcome 
rather than two appetitive outcomes of differing magnitudes. All show that animals are 
more likely to interpret ambiguous stimuli as indicative of a previously learned positive 
outcome if living in a relatively stress-free environment.  
1.7 Information integration across development 
A number of studies using the UBT have been undertaken across a range of ages from 
adolescents (Moutsiana et al., 2013) through to old age (Chowdhury et al., 2014). When 
data from studies is combined, learning parameters for good news (αG) are consistently 
higher than learning parameters for bad news (αB). However, an interesting feature of 
learning parameters for bad news (αB) is that they assume an inverse U shape over the 
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lifespan, being lowest in young and old and highest in middle age. This is not the result of 
general alterations in learning since learning parameters for good news (αG) remain flat 
over the lifespan (Figure 1.3). In other words, this variation in learning seems selective to 
bad news specifically.  
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Figure 1.3: How Information Integration Alters with Age. Learning from bad news (αB) 
changes with age following an inverse-U shape (quadratic) function; it is low in children 
and teenagers, peaks around middle age, and then starts to decline again. This pattern is not 
observed for learning of good news (αG), which remains relatively stable over the lifetime. 
Figure includes data from 4 studies (Sharot et al., 2011; Moutsiana et al., 2013; Chowdhury 
et al., 2014; Garrett et al., 2014). 
 
The neurobiological mechanism(s) giving rise to this variation in learning 
parameters with age is not known however. They could be the result of alterations in 
dopamine function or connectivity between brain regions, both of which have been 
associated with mediating biased updating in previous studies (Sharot et al., 2012b; 
Moutsiana et al., 2015) and shown to vary with age (Volkow et al., 1996; Fjell et al., 
2016). However, this variation could also be accounted for by other neurological 
mechanisms and there may be separate mechanisms operating at different stages of the 
lifespan rather than a single mechanism or combinations of mechanisms at play. Another 
possibility is that they arise out of non-physiological environmental factors. 
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1.8 Outstanding questions and aims of thesis 
The aims of this thesis are twofold. The first aim is to examine variability in belief 
updating. Since biased belief updating is suggested to maintain positive self-views (Sharot 
and Garrett, 2016) and positive self-views are often absent in depression, I investigate in 
Chapter 3 if individuals with depression show less biased belief updating. In Chapter 4, I 
examine whether biased belief updating is a fixed human tendency or state dependant, 
allowing for fluctuations when individuals are placed in a threatening environment.   
The second aim is to examine the robustness of asymmetric belief updating. To 
date, the majority of studies that have examined belief updating have done so in the 
context of beliefs about one’s own likelihood of encountering negative life events in the 
future (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett and Sharot, 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 
2013; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015; Moutsiana et al., 2013, 2015; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a, 
2012b). On the one hand, biased updating might be specific to processing information 
about one’s own likelihood (as it is this which individuals are motivated to maintain 
positive views of). However, if individuals integrate information about base rates when 
considering their own susceptibility to different life events, a bias for updating base rates 
could also exist for base rates and contribute to the maintenance of positive self views. In 
Chapter 5, I examine whether asymmetric belief updating also exists for updating base 
rates, whether base rates are integrated into revised beliefs in a Bayesian manner and 
whether asymmetric effects exist under different classifications of good and bad news. 
Finally in Chapter 6, I investigate whether a bias in updating exists for positive as well as 
negative life events.  
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1.9 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 2 details the experimental techniques used in the studies reported in Chapters 3-
6. This includes detail on the UBT, questionnaires administered and physiological 
measures used.  
In Chapter 3, I investigate differences in updating between depressed patients and 
controls and use fMRI to relate these differences to alterations in information processing. 
Since depressed patients have been shown to be less optimistic than controls it was 
hypothesised that they would exhibit less asymmetry in information integration with this 
asymmetry corresponding to differences in estimation error tracking in the brain. 
In Chapter 4, I report the result of two studies investigating how stress alters 
information integration.  
Chapter 5 details the results of a study in which I extend the UBT so that 
participants also provide estimates of the base rate for each event. This allows alternate 
ways of classifying trials into good and bad news. Under each classification scheme, it is 
then investigated the degree to which updating for good and bad news corresponds to that 
of a Bayesian agent and whether a bias in updating exists for base rates (as well as for own 
likelihoods). 
Chapter 6 details the results of an online study in which I examine if biased belief 
updating exists for positive as well as negative life events. 
In Chapter 7, I provide a summary of the main findings of each experimental 
chapter. I also outline limitations of the studies presented and suggest some directions for 
future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Experimental Methods 
   
2.1 Update bias task  
2.1.1 Task and stimuli 
The Update Bias Task (UBT) has been used in a number of studies (Chowdhury et al., 
2014; Garrett and Sharot, 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2013; Kuzmanovic et al., 
2015; Moutsiana et al., 2013, 2015; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a, 2012b) to investigate 
valence effects of belief updating. It is depicted in Figure 2.1.  
On each trial, one of 80 different stimuli is presented on screen. Each of these is an 
adverse life event such as burglary, kidney stones (see Table 2.1 for list of stimuli used). 
Participants are asked to imagine the event happening to them in the future and are then 
asked to estimate how likely the event is to happen to them in the future. Participants are 
then shown the base rate of the event in a demographically similar population to 
themselves. In a second session, immediately after the first, participants are asked again to 
provide estimates of their likelihood of encountering the same events so that it can be 
assessed how they update their estimations, following the information they are provided.  
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For each adverse life event, the base rate of that event occurring at least once to a 
person living in the same socio-cultural environment as the participants was determined 
from online resources (Office for National Statistics, Eurostat, PubMed). Very rare, or 
very common, events are not included; all events probabilities lie between 10% and 70%. 
To ensure that the range of possible overestimation is equal to the range of possible 
underestimation, participants are told that the range of probabilities lie between 3% and 
77%.  If the participant fails to submit a response in the first session or second session that 
trial is excluded from all consequent analyses.  
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Figure 2.1: The Update Bias Task. Participants are presented with 80 different life events 
(see Table 2.1) and are asked to estimate their likelihood of experiencing each event. They 
are then presented with the base rate (average likelihood) of the event occurring to someone 
like them. In a second session they are asked to re-estimate their likelihood. Trials are 
categorized into good news and bad news according to whether the base rate presented in 
the first session is below (a, good news) or above (b, bad news) participants’ first estimate.  
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A feature of this design is that participants often receive good news when the base 
rate presented to them is a low number and bad news when the base rate is a high number. 
To control for the possibility that differences in updating therefore could reflect 
differences in processing of high and low numbers, on half the trials participants estimate 
the likelihood of the event happening to them in the future and on the other half of trials, 
participants estimate the likelihood of the event not happening to them in the future. 
Framing estimations in these two ways ensures that differential updating cannot be 
attributed to differential processing of high and low numbers. Furthermore, under such 
framing half the trials are conceptually presented as negative events (i.e. divorce) and half 
as positive events (i.e. – never divorce).  
LIST A LIST B 
age related blindness back pain 
alcoholism abnormal heart rhythm 
appendicitis Alzheimer's disease 
being cheated by husband/wife anxiety disorder 
being convicted of crime arteries hardening (narrowing of blood vessels) 
bone fracture artificial joint 
car stolen asthma 
card fraud autoimmune disease 
chronic high blood pressure being fired 
chronic ringing sound in ear (tinnitus) bicycle theft 
death before 60 blood clot in vein 
death before 80 cancer_(of_digestive_system/lung/prostate/breast/skin) 
dementia computer crash with loss of important data 
depression death before 70 
diabetes (type 2) death by infection 
disease of spinal cord divorce 
domestic burglary epilepsy 
drug abuse eye cataract (clouding of the lens of the eye) 
fraud when buying something on the internet having a stroke 
gallbladder stones having fleas/lice 
genital warts hepatitis A or B 
gluten intolerance herpes 
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heart failure hospital stay longer than three weeks 
hernia (rupture of internal tissue wall) kidney stones 
house vandalised limb amputation 
household accident liver disease 
infertility migraine 
irritable bowel syndrome (disorder of the gut) osteoporosis (reduced bone density) 
knee osteoarthritis (causing knee pain and 
swelling) severe injury due to accident (traffic or house) 
miss a flight severe insomnia 
more than £30,000 debts severe teeth problems when old 
mouse/rat in house sexual dysfunction 
obesity skin burn 
Parkinson's disease theft from person 
restless legs syndrome ulcer 
serious hearing problems victim of bullying at work (nonphysical) 
sport related accident victim of mugging 
theft from vehicle victim of violence at home 
victim of violence by stranger victim of violence by acquaintance 
witness a traumatising accident victim of violence with need to go to A&E 
Table 2.1: List of stimuli used in the UBT. In the full version of the task, two lists of 40 
events are used. Participants provide first and second estimates for one of the lists (sessions 
one and two) followed by first and second estimates for the other list (sessions 3 and 4). One 
of the lists is presented in the framing “estimation of happening to you?” whilst the other list 
is presented in the framing “estimation of NOT happening to you?”.  
 
After completing the UBT, participants rate stimuli on prior experience [for the 
question “Has this event happened to you before?” the responses ranged from 1 (never) to 
6 (very often)], familiarity [for the question “Regardless if this event has happened to you 
before, how familiar do you feel it is to you from TV, friends, movies, and so on?” the 
responses ranged from 1 (not at all familiar) to 6 (very familiar)] and negativity [for the 
question “How negative would this event be for you?” the responses ranged from 1 (not 
negative at all) to 6 (very negative)]. To test memory for the information presented, 
participants are asked to provide the actual probability previously presented of each event.  
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2.1.2 Differences in design between chapters 
In Chapter 3, I use a version of the UBT which is exactly as described above only 
participants complete the task whilst in an fMRI scanner. Therefore responses are made by 
the participant via an MRI compatible button box. Due to this box only having 8 buttons, 
this meant that in the happen sessions, participants could only enter the digits 0 through to 
7 (no 8s or 9s) in the happen sessions and could only enter the digits 2 to 9 in the not 
happen sessions (no 0s or 1s).   
In Chapter 4, Experiments I and II each use a version of the UBT task in which 
only 40 events were used (each participant was presented with all events from one of the 2 
lists of events in Table 2.1, the lists used were counterbalanced over participants). Since 
only 1 list of events was used for each participants and framing has not been shown to 
affect results previously (Sharot et al., 2011), all events were presented in the happen 
framing for these two studies. Furthermore, the information (base rates) was not 
redisplayed in the second session when participants provided their 2nd estimates. In 
Experiment II, due to time constraints, participants were only asked to provide memory 
estimates and subjective ratings for half of the events.  
In Chapter 5, I use a version of the UBT which is as described above only 
participants estimate both the likelihood of each event occurring to themselves and how 
likely they think the event is to occur on average. In addition, after being presented with 
the information (base rate) in the first session, participants rate how desirable/undesirable 
they find this information.   
In Chapter 6 I use an online version of the UBT in which both positive and 
negative life events are used. This uses an alternative list of events to the negative life 
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events displayed in Table 2.1. In this version, everyday life events are used (see Chapter 
6, Table 6.1 for events used in this study) and participants rate how likely the event is to 
occur in the forthcoming month (rather than in their lifetime). Participants rated how 
negative or positive life events were and events were classified as positive and negative 
life events for each participant based on these ratings. In this version, since 1 list of 54 
events was used for each participant (as opposed to 2 lists of 40 events each) and framing 
had not been shown to affect results previously (Sharot et al., 2011), for all events 
participants estimated the likelihood of the event happening to them in the future; they did 
not estimate the likelihood of the event not happening to them in the future. Also, 
participants were only shown base rates in the first session (they did not see these again in 
the second session when providing their 2nd estimates). Participants were allowed to enter 
responses between 5% and 95% in this version. Subjective ratings for Familiarity, 
Vividness and Emotional Arousal were collected from 75% of participants in this study. 
Ratings for Past Experience, Negativity and Memory Recall was collected from all 
participants. 
2.1.3 Behavioural analysis 
2.1.3.1 Update and information integration 
Behavioural analysis is conducted as in previous studies (Chowdhury et al., 2013; Korn et 
al., 2013; Moutsiana et al., 2013; Sharot et al., 2011; Sharot et al., 2012a; Sharot et al., 
2012b) using IBM SPSS statistics (version 19). All actual (base rates) and estimated 
percentages in ‘not happen’ sessions are transformed into the corresponding numbers of 
the ‘happen’ sessions by subtracting the respective number from 100. For each participant, 
trials are classified according to whether the participant initially overestimated or 
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underestimated the probability of the life event relative to the base rate presented. 
Specifically, if their initial estimate was lower than the base rate, this information would 
be categorised as “bad news”. If their initial estimate was higher than the base rate, this 
information would be categorised as “good news”2. Trials in which the initial estimate was 
equal to the base rate are excluded from subsequent analyses since these cannot be 
categorized into either condition. 
For each event, in each session, an estimation error term is calculated as the 
absolute difference between the participant’s estimate and the corresponding base rate 
(Figure 2.1): 
Estimation Error = | First Estimate – Base Rate | 
  
Update is the difference between participants first and second estimates but this difference 
is calculated depending on whether the trial is categorised as bad news: 
Update (Good News) = First Estimate – Second Estimate  
Update (Bad News) = Second Estimate – First Estimate  
 
Thus, positive updates indicate a change toward the probability presented and negative 
updates a change away from the probability presented.  
To explore the relationship between estimation errors and update, for each 
participant, two linear regressions are conducted entering estimation errors as independent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Note	  that	  in	  Chapter	  3	  which	  uses	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  life	  events,	  this	  classification	  only	  applies	  for	  the	  negative	  life	  events.	  For	  positive	  life	  events,	  trials	  are	  classified	  in	  the	  opposite	  way.	  i.e.	  
if initial estimate was lower than the average presented, this information would be categorised as “good 
news” and if initial estimate was higher than the average presented, this information would be categorised as 
“bad news”. 	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measures and updates as dependent measures – one for trials in which participants 
received good news and one for trials in which participants received bad news.  
Update (Good News) = αG	  (Estimation Error) 
Update (Bad News) = αB	  (Estimation Error) 
This generates separate learning parameters for good news (αG)	  and	  for	  bad	  news	  (αB)	  for each participant. Learning parameters can then be evaluated at the group level (for 
example, to see if learning parameters are greater for good news than for bad news by 
conducting a paired sample ttest) and used as an individual difference measure to relate to 
other variables of interest (for example to correlate with depression symptoms in Chapter 
3, or with stress scores in Chapter 4). 
2.1.3.2 Control variables 
Memory errors are calculated as the absolute difference between the base rate and the 
participants’ recollection of that statistic:  
Memory Error = | Base Rate – Recollection of Probability Presented | 
Mean memory errors are then calculated for good news and bad news for each 
participant to examine whether there are differences in memory recall for the information 
provided in the UBT (Sharot et al., 2011). Similarly, mean rating scores for each rating 
that participants provide for each event (emotional arousal, familiarity, negativity, past 
experience and vividness) are calculated for good and bad news events and these 
compared to examine if differences exist on any of the dimensions. Note, that there is no 
need to correct for multiple comparisons when examining this since the aim of this 
analysis is to identify potential confounding factors (i.e. by not applying a correction such 
as Bonferroni, the analyses are more sensitive).  
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It is also important to control for participant priors, to rule out the possibility that 
valence effects are the result of the starting position of participants beliefs. For example, if 
one believes in general that negative life events are unlikely to happen to them (low prior) 
they may get (and expect to get) bad news more often in the task (and vice versa if one has 
a high prior). So valence effects found in the task could be attributed to other explanations 
(such as information expectation) if care is not taken to control for priors. This can be 
done by adding participants’ mean first estimate as a covariate in the relevant analysis. 
In addition, it is important to control for differences in estimation errors (see 
section 2.1.4 below). 
2.1.4 Base rate distribution and estimation errors 
When investigating biases in belief updating it is important to control for estimation 
errors. Running simulations that fail to ensure this create spurious biases in updating 
unless one controls for estimation errors, see below. Note that the purpose of these 
simulations is to demonstrate that skewing the distribution of base rates can artificially 
produce a bias in updating. It is not an attempt to try to identify and/or capture the precise 
cognitive processes participants engage in when undertaking the task. In the simulations I 
present here I invoke very basic assumptions about human behaviour, the idea being that 
if these nonetheless reveal updating patterns similar to human participants there is a 
confound in the task which needs to be addressed.  
Consider four lists of base rates for life events; the first is skewed towards the 
bottom end (i.e. the majority of base rates are rare and fall below the midpoint of 50%), 
(Figure 2.2a); the second is skewed towards the top end (i.e. majority of base rates are 
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common and fall above the midpoint of 50%, (Figure 2.2b); the third and fourth are 
normally distributed around 50%, (Figure 2.2c and 2.2d, this is the actual set used in the 
study reported in Chapter 6). 
Fr
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Base Rate 
(a) Bottom Heavy (b) Top Heavy 
(d) Normally distributed (negative life events) (c) Normally distributed (positive life events) 
 
Figure 2.2: Histograms of base rates distributions used in simulations. Simulations were run 
using different distributions of base rates to examine the conditions under which an update 
bias is artificially produced. (a) Base rates are skewed towards the bottom end (i.e. the 
majority of base rates are rare). (b) Base rates are skewed towards the top end (i.e. majority 
of base rates are common). (c, d) Base rates used in the study reported in Chapter 6 which 
are normally distributed around a mean of 50% both for (c) positive life events and (d) 
negative life events.  
 
For each simulation I randomly generate a first estimate on every trial for each 
virtual participant. This will be a random integer drawn from a uniform discrete 
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distribution between 5 and 95. I then “present” the simulator with the actual base rate for 
the event on that trial (information) and generate a second estimate - a random integer 
between the first estimate and the information (also drawn from a uniform distribution). 
For example, for the question “how likely are you to go out of town for leisure in the 
upcoming month” the simulator may randomly select 10% (first estimate), it will then 
observe a base rate of 36% (information) and adjust its answer to a random number 
between 10 and 36, let’s say 30% (second estimate). Thus, update on this trial would be 
20 (update is calculated such that positive numbers always indicate a move towards the 
base rate).  
I run 1000 such simulations (i.e., “experiments”) for each set of base rates (Figure 
2.2). If the data produced by a simulation results in biased updating, this will indicate that 
the bias is due to a statistical artefact (the result of the mathematical constraints of the 
task) and not to an asymmetry in human learning. If, however, the simulation produces no 
bias in updating, but a bias is observed for human data, this would suggest the bias is due 
to asymmetric learning not to a statistical artefact.  
The simulations clearly show that when base rates are skewed, an artificial bias in 
belief updating is observed (Figure 2.3a and 2.3b), but not when the base rates are 
normally distributed (Figure 2.3c). Interestingly, when an artificial bias is detected it is 
observed in opposite directions for positive and negative life events creating a distinct 
“flip”. Specifically, when base rates are skewed towards the bottom end of the scale (rare 
events, Figure 2.2a), the simulation shows greater update for bad news than good news 
for positive life events (significant difference in 100% of the simulations run, Figure 
2.3a), while for negative life events update for good news is greater than bad news 
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(significant difference in 100% of simulations, Figure 2.3a). However, when the base 
rates are skewed towards the top end of the scale (common events, Figure 2.2b), the 
opposite flip is observed (Figure 2.3b); larger update for good news than bad news for 
positive life events (significant difference in 100% of cases) and the opposite pattern for 
negative life events (Figure 2.3b, significant difference in 100% of cases). Finally, when 
the base rates are normally distributed the simulation does not reveal asymmetric updating 
(Figure 2.3c, significant difference in only 5% of cases for positive and only 5% of cases 
for negative life events).  
* * * * 
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Figure 2.3: Simulations Results. For each group of base rates portrayed in Figure 2.2 I ran 
simulations to examine patterns of updating. When base rates were skewed, an artificial 
update bias was revealed, which flips for positive and negative life events (these artificial 
biases are abolished when controlling for estimation errors). Simulation for (a) base rates 
that are skewed towards the bottom end of the scale (rare events) and (b) base rates that are 
skewed towards the top end of the scale (common events). (c) When base rates are normally 
distributed there is no artificial bias in updating. Error bars represent SEM, * p<0.05, two-
tailed paired sample t-test 
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Why is an artificial bias produced for stimuli with a skewed distribution? If most 
base rates are skewed towards large numbers then on average there is more room to alter 
estimates when the first estimate is smaller than the base rate than when it is larger. In 
other words the difference between the first estimate and the information given (i.e. the 
estimation error) will be larger when subjects receive good news for positive events and 
when they receive bad news for negative events. Thus, updates will be greater when 
information is “good” for positive events and “bad” for negative events, and vice versa 
when base rates are skewed towards low numbers. This statistical artefact, however, can 
be corrected by controlling for “estimation errors”. If in the simulations above estimation 
errors are controlled for, no bias is observed for any set of base rates. This was tested by 
running an additional 20 simulations (10 for positive life events, 10 for negative life 
events, 20 participants per simulation) for each set of skewed base rates. For each set of 
simulated data I then conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with valence (good 
news/bad news) as a factor and entering the difference in estimation errors between good 
news and bad news as a covariate. When base rates were skewed towards the bottom end 
of the scale (Figure 2.2a) a valence effect between good news and bad news was not 
significant in 19 (95%) of these simulations. When base rates were skewed towards the 
top end of the scale (Figure 2.2b) a valence effect between good and bad news was no 
longer significant in all (100%) of these simulations.   
Thus, to avoid false conclusions, researchers should either use normally distributed 
base rates with a mean at the midpoint of the scale and/or control for estimation errors, or 
both. In the case of the studies presented in this thesis, the distribution of base rates of the 
events used in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 is positively skewed (albeit less extreme than the base 
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rate distributions used in the simulations above, Figure 2.2a). Estimation errors are 
controlled for in each of these studies therefore. In Chapter 6, the events used are normally 
distributed (they are the actual base rates used in the simulations for normally distributed 
stimuli, Figure 2.2c and Figure 2.2d) and in addition I control for estimation errors.    
2.1.5 Power analysis 
The effect size index (dz) for comparing update for bad and good news (using a paired 
sample t-test), calculated from the original study that used the UBT (Sharot et al, 2011), is 
estimated to be dz = 1.00 (Mean Update [standard deviation]: bad news: 7.66[3.77]; good 
news: 11.92[4.08]). Using this effect size, to detect a difference in updating between good 
news and bad news requires a sample size of n = 10 to achieve a power level of 80% (beta 
= 0.2) and a false discovery rate of 5% (alpha = 0.05). All studies reported in this thesis 
use a sample size of n>10. The effect size index for detecting differences in updating 
(from bad news) between participants (taken from Sharot et al., 2012a) was estimated to 
be dz =1.18. Using this effect size to detect a difference between two groups requires a 
sample size of n=13 per group to achieve a power level of 80% (beta = 0.2) and a false 
discovery rate of 5% (alpha = 0.05). All studies reported in this thesis that examine group 
differences in updating (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) use a sample size of n>13 per group. 
Power calculations were undertaken using G*Power (http://www.gpower.hhu.de/en). 
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2.2 Physiological measures 
2.2.1 fMRI; Chapter 3 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) is a non-invasive technique which 
detects the oxygen concentration of blood in different parts of the brain. Since the onset of 
neural activity necessitates a change in this concentration, changes in Blood Oxygen Level 
Dependant (BOLD) signal can be used to infer changes in neural activity over time. This 
has been validated by studies which have simultaneously recorded neural 
(electrophysiological recordings) and BOLD (using fMRI) signal in primates (Logothetis 
et al, 2001; Goense and Logothetis, 2008).  
fMRI takes advantage of the fact that oxygenated blood (which is diamagnetic) has 
different magnetic properties than deoxygenated blood (which is paramagnetic). As a 
result, the rate at which protons present in haemoglobin (an oxygen transporting protein in 
red blood cells) realign with the magnetic field depends on the ratio of oxygenated to 
deoxygenated red blood cells. Importantly, this ratio changes during and directly 
following brain activity as active neurons mobilise oxygen (Ogawa et al., 1992). 
Specifically, there will be an initial increase in deoxygenated blood as neurons use up 
available oxygen sources. This will be followed by a surge in oxygenated blood as 
haemoglobin replenishes oxygen that has been depleted during neural activity. This 
increase in oxygenated blood and corresponding reduction of deoxygenated blood can be 
detected as an increase in the MRI signal (Ogawa et al., 1992), which usually peaks 5-6 
seconds after onset of the neural activity itself.  
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Before functional scans can be analysed, a number of pre-processing steps are 
carried out. There are a number of these steps available 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/doc/spm5_manual.pdf), however only the steps applied 
in Chapter 3 are covered here. The first pre-processing step is to make adjustments to 
images to account for  head movement of participants whilst in the fMRI scanner. Such 
movements effectively mean that different neurons occupy a voxel space previously 
occupied by other neurons (in a nearby space). To account for this, realignment uses the 
first image in the sequence as a reference image and applies a rigid-body affine 
transformation. However, since this procedure does not completely correct for movement 
artefacts (Andersson et al, 2001), two other approaches can be applied to further reduce 
noise in the signal related to movement artefacts. The first is to apply unwarping to 
account for interactions between inhomogeneities (distortions) in the magnetic field and 
head movement. The second is to include the 6 movement parameters estimated from the 
realignment procedure as covariates in the design matrix (see below). Both of these 
additional corrections were used in the analysis reported in Chapter 3.  
Owing to heterogeneity in the size of human brains, to compare images across 
different participants in a study and allow anatomical comparisons to be made between 
different studies (for instance, that the same area of the brain is engaged during a specific 
cognitive process in different studies), images need to be converted into a common space. 
Normalization is the process by which each image is warped into a standard space based 
on a specified template. In the analysis reported here (Chapter 3) the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) reference brain was used.  
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The final pre-processing step is to spatially smooth the images by applying a filter. 
This improves the signal to noise ratio by removing high frequency information (i.e. small 
scale changes in the image). In the analysis reported in Chapter 3, this was done by 
convolving the images with Gaussian kernels with full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) 
of 8mm.   
 There are a wide variety of ways to analyse fMRI data depending on the nature of 
the research question being asked. The approach taken in Chapter 3 is to conduct a mass 
univariate approach. Simplifying, this essentially conducts a separate multiple regression 
for each and every voxel in the brain. In each of these regressions, the time course of the 
BOLD response at a particular voxel is the dependent variable3. Variables specified by the 
experimenter constitute the independent variable(s), input as a design matrix. In the 
experiment reported in Chapter 3, independent variables of interest comprise two types: 
(1) categorical regressors which specify when events of specific types occurred (for 
instance when good news was presented, when bad news was presented) (2) parametric 
regressors which modulate a categorical regressor with a quantity of experimental interest 
such that the regressor scales according to that quantity, allowing one to examine how 
BOLD response covaries with it.  
For each voxel, beta parameters along with their corresponding F statistic (i.e. 
“usefulness” in accounting for variance in the BOLD response) are estimated for each 
independent variable included in the linear model using restricted maximum likelihood. 
These statistics can then be viewed in the form of a statistical map, highlighting for 
instance, voxels with high t statistics for a particular model parameter.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Since	  observations	  in	  the	  time	  series	  are	  not	  independent	  (i.e.	  there	  is	  often	  correlation	  in	  the	  BOLD	  response	  from	  one	  scan	  to	  another),	  a	  correction	  is	  applied	  to	  ensure	  sphericity	  (Glaser,	  2004).	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To reliably interpret the significance of these results however it is necessary to 
correct for the large number of comparisons made that comes out of running a regression 
for each and every voxel. One means of doing this is to apply a Bonferroni correction 
according to the number of voxels. Whilst this stringently guards against Type I errors, it 
also runs the risk of incurring Type II errors (i.e. failing to detect significant effects that 
are present in the data), particularly since voxels close to one another will often have very 
similar BOLD response profiles. Hence, less conservative approaches are often adopted.  
One of these is to abandon looking at the significance of betas across the whole 
brain and instead restrict the search area to a specific anatomical region, defined a priori 
(for instance on theoretical grounds or from regions identified in previous comparable 
studies). This means that a correction is only applied for the number of voxels in the 
specified region (so called small volume correction). In the analysis presented in Chapter 
3 this was a viable option as a similar fMRI study had previously been run using the UBT 
(Sharot et al., 2011) and identified the right Inferior Frontal Gyrus as a region tracking bad 
news.   
Another approach is to correct for the number of clusters (i.e. groups of voxels) 
rather than the number of voxels. However, in order to do this there needs to be some 
initial significance threshold set in order to generate clusters in the first instance. Setting a 
p value such as p<0.001 acts as a filter on the map of voxel by voxel t statistics by only 
including voxels that meet this threshold of significance and correcting for the number of 
clusters that form at this threshold. In the analysis in Chapter 3, this was also adopted as 
an approach with activity reported cluster level corrected with the cluster defining 
threshold used set at p<0.001. 
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2.2.2 Skin conductance and cortisol; Chapter 4 
Exposure to stress causes alterations to brain function via two systems: the hypothalamic 
pituitary adrenal (HPA) axis and the sympathetic component of the autonomic nervous 
system (de Kloet et al., 2011; Lupien and McEwen, 1997).  
The former causes the secretion of glucocorticoids from the adrenal cortex which 
acts to mobilise energy resources by increasing the glucose content of blood. The 
predominant glucocorticoid in humans is cortisol and this can be measured from saliva as 
well as blood and urine (Kirschbaum and Hellhamer, 1994). The process by which cortisol 
is secreted in response to a stressor is relatively gradual; peak cortisol response usually 
occurs 30-40 minutes after onset of a stressor and returns to baseline (pre-stressor levels) 
around 1 hour after the stressor has ended (Dickerson and Kemney, 2004). In Experiment 
I reported in Chapter 4, saliva samples were taken at 4 different time intervals across the 
experiment to measure cortisol response over an extended period.   
Changes to the sympathetic component causes the release of catecholamines 
adrenaline and noradrenaline. Unlike the HPA, this autonomic component is fast acting, 
occurring immediately after onset of the stressor and returning to baseline around 10 
minutes after the stressor has ended (Kirschbaum et al., 1993). The release of 
catecholamines results in a number of physiological responses including increase in heart 
rate, blood pressure and electrodermal responses. Skin conductance is one specific type of 
electrodermal activity which can be measured by applying an external electrical current at 
a constant voltage level to the skin. Sweat from eccrine sweat glands changes the 
conductivity of the skin and is regulated by the sympathetic component of the autonomic 
nervous system originating in the hypothalamus. Hence changes in skin conductance 
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(from sweating) are believed to reflect general changes in the autonomic nervous system 
due to psychological processes such as arousal (Figner and Murphy, 2011).   
 Analysis of skin conductance can be approached in one of two ways depending on 
what the experimenter is attempting to tie conductance responses to. One approach is to 
look at Skin Conductance Level (SCL). This examines mean conductivity over a specified 
time interval (such as 30 seconds or an experimental block) providing a measure of 
general arousal levels (i.e. tonic activity) during this period. This is useful for instance if 
one wants to see if participants are in a higher state of arousal in one condition than 
another (by comparing SCLs between conditions), or to ascertain if a stress manipulation 
has been effective (e.g. by comparing SCL pre and post manipulation). Another approach 
is to look at Skin Conductance Response (SCR). This examines the phasic response of 
skin conductance; variation in the signal over a short time scale (usually a few seconds). 
This is useful if one wants to look at how skin conductance is modulated on a trial by trial 
basis such as in response to specific types of stimuli. In this way a clumsy analogy is to 
say that analysis of SCR can serve a similar role to that of BOLD signal in fMRI in that it 
allows one to infer a hidden variable (e.g. sympathetic nerve firing or neural response) 
from observable data (some kind of timecourse be that SCR or BOLD signal).  
 In Experiment I reported in Chapter 4, I was interested in ascertaining whether a 
stress manipulation was effective in inducing a sympathetic response. Hence mean SCL 
pre and post manipulation (each recorded over 2 minute periods) were compared.   
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2.3 Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview; Chapter 3 
The Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI) (Sheehan et al., 1998) is based 
on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) used 
by clinicians and researchers to diagnose and classify mental disorders. It is a structured 
interview carried out by a trained researcher which proceeds through sections, with each 
section asking questions about a specific mental disorder. These include; Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD), Bipolar Disorder, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, panic 
disorder, agoraphobia, post-traumatic stress disorder, alcohol and substance 
abuse/dependence, psychotic symptoms, anorexia, bulimia and generalized anxiety 
disorder.   
Training to conduct the MINI with a participant involved 2 stages: (1) myself 
observing 6 separate MINIs administered by a researcher who was already trained in 
administering the MINI; (2) myself being observed by a trained researcher carrying out 4 
MINI interviews with feedback provided after each interview. 
The MINI was used in Chapter 3 to diagnose potential MDD patients with 
depression and to examine other disorders depressed patients were experiencing or had 
experienced in the past. It was also used to ensure that control participants did not have 
depression or any other mental disorders either at the time of study or previously. 
 
2.4. Mood/Personality Questionnaires 
2.4.1 Beck Depression Inventory; Chapters 3-6 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck et al., 1961) is a 21-question self-rating scale 
used to provide a measure of individual’s current depression symptoms. For each of the 21 
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items, participants select 1 statement from 4 available which are scored from 0 to 3 
(example: 0 = I do not feel sad; 1 = I feel sad; 2 = I am sad all the time and I can’t snap 
out of it; 3 = I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it).  Participants are asked to select 
the statement that most concurs with how they have been feeling the past few days. Scores 
across all 21 items are summed to create an overall score. Scores range from 0 to 63 with 
the following scores (Beck et al., 1988) suggested as guidelines: 
• Scores below 10 indicate normal mood. 
• Scores 10-18 indicate mild depression. 
• Scores 19-29 indicate moderate depression. 
• Scores 30 and above indicate severe depression. 
2.4.2 State Trait Anxiety Inventory; Chapters 3 and 4 
The STAI-6 (Marteau and Bekker, 1992) is a short version of the Spielberger State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, et al., 1983) which has shown reliability and sensitivity to 
different degrees of anxiety (Marteau and Bekker, 1992). Participants report their current 
anxiety state according to 6 statements (e.g. I am worried) on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = 
not at all to 4 = very much). Scores range from 6 to 24 with high scores indicating high 
levels of anxiety. 
2.4.3 Life Orientation Test Revised; Chapters 3-6 
The Life Orientation Test Revised (LOTR) is a 10-question self-rating scale used to 
provide a measure of individuals’ trait optimism (Scheier and Carver, 1985; Scheier et al., 
1994). Participants rate how much they agree with 10 statements (for example: In 
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uncertain times I usually expect the best) on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 = I disagree a lot; 2 = I 
disagree a little; 3 = I neither agree nor disagree; 4 = I agree a little; 5 = I agree a lot). The 
convention is to convert these to a scale from 0 to 4 (i.e. 1 is subtracted from participants 
responses). Four of the items on the questionnaire are filler items and are not used for the 
scoring. Three of the remaining items are reversed scored (i.e. 0=4; 1=3, 2=2; 3=1; 4=0). 
The six items are then summed to create an overall trait optimism score. Scores can range 
from 0 (pessimistic) to 24 (optimistic). Reliability of the LOT-R in measuring trait 
optimism has been found across a number of studies (e.g. Robinson-Whelen et al., 1997; 
Carver et al., 2005; Sharot et al., 2007; Puri and Robinson, 2007; Rasmussen et al., 2009).  
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Chapter 3 
Neural substrates of Unbiased Belief Updating 
in Depression 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Contrary to traditional psychological theories that maintain that good mental health is sub-
served by accurate beliefs in relation to reality, a large body of literature suggests that 
biases may promote adaptive functioning. In particular, positive illusions (including 
overly positive evaluation of the self, unrealistic optimism and an exaggerated sense of 
control) are argued to enhance mental health by encouraging productivity, social 
interaction, subjective happiness and physical health (McKay and Dennett, 2010; Taylor 
et al., 2003); but see (Colvin and Block, 1994; Compton, 1992). In healthy individuals, 
positive illusions are especially apparent under circumstances of adversity (Taylor and 
Armor, 1996) which may enhance resiliency to stressful life events. By contrast, 
moderately depressed individuals have been reported to display a less positive, but 
relatively unbiased, view of the self (Coyne and Gotlib, 1983), the future (Strunk and 
Adler, 2009) and sense of control (Alloy and Abramson, 1979) – dubbed “depressive 
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realism” (but see: Allan et al., 2007; Moore and Fresco, 2012). Importantly however, 
severely depressed individuals often show negative biases in these domains (Roiser et al., 
2011) which can predict fatal outcomes (Oquendo et al., 2004). 
 It has recently been found that depressed patients lack the positive skewed belief 
updating bias seen in healthy controls when they update their expectations about the future 
(Korn et al., 2013). These findings raise an intriguing question as to what differs in 
depression in terms of underlying neural substrates that support an unbiased belief 
formation about the future. 
 Previously it has been demonstrated that, in healthy participants, biased updating 
in response to positive and negative news is mediated by a relatively weak correlation 
between brain activity and negative estimation errors, but intact coding of positive 
estimation errors (Sharot et al., 2011). Here, utilizing the belief-updating task in 
combination with functional brain imaging I ask whether depression is associated with 
neural responses that are likely to support a more unbiased integration of information 
about the future.  
3.2 Materials and Methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
Thirty individuals aged 18 to 65 participated in the study (half unmedicated depressed 
patients and half healthy controls). Depressed participants were identified through 
Camden and Islington Foundation Trust Psychological Treatment Services or recruited by 
advertisement. Healthy controls were recruited from UCL psychology subject pool and 
matched to depressed participants for age, gender and level of education. One control 
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participant was subsequently excluded from the analysis due to a high score on the BDI 
(>10). None of the participants had taken antidepressant medication for at least six weeks 
prior to undertaking the study due to a variety of personal choices unrelated to the study 
itself. No participants had a period of substance or alcohol abuse in the six months prior to 
undertaking the study. See Table 3.1 for demographic and clinical information. 
	   Controls	   MDD	  Patients	  
N	  (Male)	  	   	  14	  (9)	   	  15	  (9)	  
Age1	   30.36	  (8.35)	   31.47	  (9.16)	  
Level	  of	  Education*2	   2.64	  (0.81)	   2.60	  (0.88)	  
BDI3	   2.21	  (2.75)	   25.80	  (9.97)	  
N	  with	  History	  of	  Alcohol/Substance	  Abuse	   0	  (0%)	   4	  (26%)	  
N	  receiving	  psychotherapy	   0	  (0%)	   2	  (13%)	  
Age	  of	  Onset	  of	  First	  Depressive	  Episode	   0	  (0%)	   18.64	  (7.01)	  
N	  with	  at	  Least	  Two	  Depressive	  Episodes	   0	  (0%)	   14	  (93%)	  
N	  Previously	  Attempting	  Suicide	   0	  (0%)	   2	  (13%)	  	  
Table 3.1: Demographic and clinical characteristics of participants. Figures represent mean 
(SD) unless stated otherwise *Coded as follows: 1) High School; 2) Bachelors Degree; 3) 
Masters Degree; 4) PhD; 1Independent sample t test: t(27) = 0.34 (>0.73); 2Independent 
sample t test: t(27) = -0.13 (>0.89); 3Independent sample t test: t(27) = 8.71 (<0.05) 	  
Before the study, all participants were assessed for psychiatric disorders by a 
trained researcher using the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Inventory (MINI) 
(Sheehan et al., 1998). Training involved the researcher observing 6 separate MINI 
interviews and then being observed carrying out 4 MINI interviews with detailed feedback 
provided after each interview. The MINI confirmed that depressed participants had 
experienced depressive episodes in the past and met criteria for a major depressive episode 
at the time of undertaking the study. For controls, the MINI confirmed that participants 
had not experienced any depressive episodes during their lifetime. The MINI was also 
used to verify that participants in both groups had no other past or present psychiatric 
conditions, other than anxiety disorders in the depressed participants. Participants that did 
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not conform to any of the above were not invited to participate in the study further. All 
participants completed the BDI (controls: mean (range) BDI = 2.21 (0-9); MDD: mean 
(range) BDI = 25.80 (13-44)). The majority of depressed participants were mildly (n=5) or 
moderately (n=7) depressed, with a minority (n=3) severely depressed. 
All participants gave informed consent and were paid for their participation. The 
study was approved by the London Queen Square Research Ethics Committee. 
3.2.2 Procedure  
The procedure was identical to a previous study (Sharot et al., 2011) and is outlined in 
Chapter 2. Participants went through three practice trials. The session began with a short 
structural scan, followed by four functional runs consisting of 40 trials each (all 80 events 
were presented twice). Finally, an additional longer structural scan was performed. 
3.2.3 Behavioural task 
The paradigm was adapted from previous studies (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Korn et al., 
2013; Moutsiana et al., 2013; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012b) and depicted in 
Experimental Methods, Chapter 2. Participants had up to 6s to respond using a button 
box with four buttons in each hand. Each button corresponded to one digit. The digits 0 
through 7 could be used to enter the estimated likelihoods in the ‘happen’ estimation and 
digits 2 through 9 in the ‘not happen’ estimation. If the participant failed to respond, then 
that trial was excluded from all subsequent analyses (mean trials with no response = 1.38, 
s.d. = 2.83). A fixation cross then appeared for 1–5 s (jittered). Next, the event description 
appeared again for 2 s, together with the average probability of that event to occur (or not 
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occur, depending on ‘happen’ or ‘not happen’ sessions). Finally, a fixation cross appeared 
for 1–3 s (jittered). See Figure 3.1 for task timings.  
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Figure 3.1: Timeline of task. On each trial, participants were presented with a short 
description of one of 80 adverse events (4 seconds). They were then asked to estimate how 
likely this event was to occur to them. Participants had up to 6 seconds to input a response. 
Following display of a fixation cross (1-5 seconds jittered) they were presented with the 
average probability of that event occurring to a person living in the same sociocultural 
environment as them (2 seconds). Trials ended with a fixation cross (1-3 seconds jittered). 
3.2.4 Behavioural analysis 
Behavioural analysis was conducted as described previously (Chowdhury et al., 2014; 
Korn et al., 2013; Moutsiana et al., 2013; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012b) and in 
Experimental Methods, Chapter 2. Trials in which the initial estimate was equal to the 
average presented were excluded from subsequent analyses (mean = 1.83 trials, s.d. = 
1.65) as these could not be categorized into either condition. Average update scores were 
entered into a two (valence: good/bad) by two (group: MDD/Control) repeated-measures 
ANOVA.  
Average memory error scores for good news and bad news were calculated for 
each participant and entered into a two (valence: good/bad) by two (group: MDD/Control) 
repeated-measures ANOVA. ANOVAs were also performed on scores of all other scales 
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(negativity, emotional arousal, vividness, familiarity, past experience) as well as on other 
task measures (initial estimates, reaction times, estimation errors, number of trials).  
3.2.5 MRI scanning  
Scanning was performed at the Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging at UCL using a 
3T Siemens Allegra scanner with a Siemens head coil. Functional images were acquired 
as echo-planar (EPI) T2*-weighted images. Time of repetition (TR) = 2.73 sec, time of 
echo (TE) = 30 ms, flip angle (FA) = 90, matrix = 64 X 64, field of view (FOV) = 192 
mm, slice thickness = 2 mm. A total of 42 axial slices (-30° tilt) were sampled for whole 
brain coverage, in-plane resolution = 3mm x 3mm.  
3.2.6 fMRI data analysis 
Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM5, Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/) was used for fMRI data analysis. After discarding the 
first six dummy volumes, images were realigned to the seventh volume, unwarped, 
normalized to a standard EPI template based on the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
reference brain, resampled to 2 mm × 2 mm × 2 mm voxels and spatially smoothed with 
an isotropic 8-mm full-width at half-maximum Gaussian kernel. Low frequency artefacts 
were removed using a 1/128 Hz high-pass filter and temporal autocorrelation intrinsic to 
the fMRI time series was corrected using an AR(1) process. For each participant, a 
design-matrix was created with event onsets time-locked to the temporal positions of: 
event presentation; presentation of cue prompting response; motor response; and 
presentation of information (see Figure 3.1 for timeline of task). These were modelled as 
durations of 4, 0, 0 and 2 seconds respectively. For all task components (except for motor 
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responses), regressors were subdivided into two conditions: trials of events for which par-
ticipants received good news and trials of events for which they received bad news, 
resulting in seven regressors for each session. These events were convolved with a 
canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) to create regressors of interest. Motion 
correction regressors estimated from the realignment procedure were entered as covariates 
of no interest. 
To identify regions tracking estimation errors, absolute estimation errors were 
entered as parametric regressors modulating the events in which information was 
presented. For each condition (that is, for trials in which information was better than 
expected and trials in which information was worse) regions showing significant effects 
across both healthy and depressed participants were identified (p < 0.05, cluster-level 
corrected across the whole brain; images first thresholded at p < 0.001, uncorrected). 
Owing to the fact that past research (Sharot et al., 2011)  shows that individual differences 
in the UBT are best predicted by region(s) inversely tracking bad news estimation errors, 
betas from the peak voxel in the region(s) tracking bad news estimation errors were 
extracted and compared between depressed participants and controls using an independent 
sample t test (p < 0.05) in SPSS. Previous research suggests that peak voxel activity can 
be a better predictor of electrophysiological measures of activation than average cluster 
(Arthurs and Boniface, 2003). 
In addition, the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) was selected as an a-priori ROI 
because previous findings (Sharot et al., 2011) showed that the degree to which BOLD 
signals in this region track bad news estimation errors differentiated between participants 
with high and low trait optimism. Thus it was examined whether a similar difference 
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existed between depressed and controls in the anatomically defined rIFG using small 
volume correction (SVC).  
All activations are displayed on sections of the standard MNI reference brain. 
Anatomical labels were assigned using the Talairach Daemon database (University of 
Texas Health Science Center San Antonio; http://www.talairach.org/) according to peak 
voxels in Talairach and Tournoux coordinate space. rIFG was anatomically defined by 
creating an ROI mask using WFU Pickatlas (http://fmri.wfubmc.edu/software/PickAtlas). 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Unbiased updating in MDD, biased updating in controls 
Unbiased updating in depressed individuals was found, but a valence-dependent updating 
bias in healthy individuals. Specifically, a group (MDD/healthy) by valence (good 
news/bad news) ANOVA revealed a significant interaction (F(1,27) = 9.16, p < 0.01, 
Figure 3.2). Replicating previous findings (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2013; 
Moutsiana et al., 2013; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a, 2012b), healthy participants updated 
their beliefs to a greater extent in response to good news relative to bad news (t(13) = 
5.00, p < 0.001; 93% of healthy participants showed greater updating in response to good 
news). No such difference was observed in the MDD group (t(14) = 1.49, p > 0.15; 60% 
of depressed participants showed greater updating in response to good news, see also 
(Korn et al., 2013) for similar findings in hospitalized, medicated, depressed patients). The 
interaction was further characterised by greater updating in response to bad news (t(27) = 
2.96, p < 0.01) in the MDD group compared to the healthy controls, with no significant 
difference in updating between groups in response to good news (t(27) = -0.37, p > 0.70). 
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These results suggest that depression, in contrast to good mental health, is related to a lack 
of discounting of bad news, resulting in unbiased updating of beliefs in response to good 
and bad news. 
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Figure 3.2: Unbiased updating in MDD but biased updating in controls. After receiving 
good news that presented an opportunity to adjust beliefs in a positive direction, healthy 
participants updated their estimations to a greater extent than after receiving bad news that 
called for adjustments in a negative direction. In contrast, depressed participants updated 
their beliefs to a similar extent after receiving good and bad news, and updated their beliefs 
more than healthy individuals when receiving bad news. Error bars represent s.e.m. *P < 
0.05, two-tailed independent/paired samples t-test.  
 
3.3.2 Control variables 
To examine whether the relationship between depression and updating could be explained 
by any other factor, I tested for a relationship between depression and all other variables 
recorded. 
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3.3.2.1 Memory 
After the scanning session, participants were asked to indicate the actual probability (as 
previously presented) of each event occurring on average. Memory errors were calculated 
as the absolute difference between the actual probability previously presented and the 
participants’ recollection of that statistic (see Experimental Methods, Chapter 2). 
Memory errors did not differ between groups (see Table 5.2) and there was no interaction 
with valence (F(1,27) = 1.07, p = 0.31). 
3.3.2.2 Life event ratings 
Participants rated life events on five scales (past life experience with the events, 
familiarity with the events, ability to imagine them vividly, emotional arousal and 
negativity). The scores revealed that past experience and familiarity with the adverse life 
events, as well as the ability to vividly imagine the events and the subjective sense of 
emotional arousal in response to the events, did not differ between MDD and healthy 
controls and did not interact with valence (see Table 3.2 for statistics). However, how 
negative the participants rated the events did reveal a group by valence interaction 
(F(1,27) = 6.76, p = 0.02). MDD patients rated life events that they received bad news for 
during the experiment as less aversive than events they received good news for. This was 
the opposite in the case of healthy controls who rated life events for which they received 
bad news as more aversive than life events for which they received good news. Thus I 
repeated the main analysis of update scores while controlling for differential scores of 
negativity (i.e. scores on good news trials minus scores on bad news trials). After entering 
these scores as covariates, the group by valence interaction on update scores remained 
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significant (F(1,26) = 5.10, p < 0.05). Thus, differential update could not be explained by 
differences in the degree of the perceived negativity of the events, by familiarity or by past 
experience with the events, by whether the events were imagined vividly or experienced 
as more or less emotionally arousing.  
3.3.2.3 Task factors 
There were no differences across groups in the number of missed responses, nor the 
number of good news and bad news trials. These factors did not differ across valence nor 
did valence interact with group (see Table 3.2 for statistics). Thus, MDD participants did 
not miss more responses than controls and were not more likely to encounter good news 
trials than bad news trials. The magnitude of the estimation errors did not differ between 
groups (bad news: t(27) = -0.02, p > 0.99, good news t(27) = 0.64, p > 0.53). Participants’ 
priors - their initial estimates of the probability of the events - did not differ across groups 
however they did correlate with BDI scores (r = 0.38; p < 0.05). In other words, the more 
depressed the individual, the more likely they were to estimate their chances of 
encountering aversive events as greater (also see Strunk et al., 2006). Initial estimates also 
correlated with updating for good news (r=0.52, p<0.01) and for bad news (r = 0.41, 
p<0.05). Reaction time for first estimates did not differ between groups. However, 
reaction time for second estimates did reveal a valence by group interaction (F(1,27) = 
6.24, p < 0.05) with MDD participants slightly faster than controls to re-estimate their 
likelihood of encountering an event they previously received good news for. After 
entering the difference in second estimate reaction time as a covariate along with initial 
estimates and differential scores of negativity (see above), the group by valence 
interaction on update scores remained significant (F(1,24) = 5.39, p < 0.05).  
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   MDD	  mean	  (SD)	   CONTROLS	  mean	  (SD)	  
Questionnaire	  and	  variables	   Good	  news	   Bad	  news	   Good	  news	   Bad	  news	  
Subjective	  Scales	  Questionnaire:	  All	  
scales	  1	  =	  low	  to	  6	  =	  high	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Familiarity	  v	  	   3.88	  (0.82)	   3.62	  (0.84)	   4.06	  (0.99)	   3.67	  (0.92)	  
Prior	  experience	  v	   1.65	  (0.31)	   1.46	  (0.24)	   1.50	  (0.68)	   1.39	  (0.64)	  
Vividness	  v	   3.87	  (0.84)	   3.52	  (0.75)	   3.68	  (0.89)	   3.50	  (0.81)	  
Emotional	  arousal	  	   3.24	  (0.79)	   2.95	  (0.70)	   3.29	  (0.85)	   3.34	  (0.95)	  
Negativity	  v*g	   3.97	  (0.71)	   3.76	  (0.61)	   3.98	  (0.68)	   4.09	  (0.67)	  
Task-­‐related	  variables	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Memory	  errors	   11.26	  (4.37)	   10.39	  (3.38)	   11.23	  (3.29)	   11.45	  (1.86)	  
Initial	  estimates	  v	   43.25	  (7.35)	   21.01	  (3.2)	   44.07	  (5.22)	   19.84	  (4.47)	  
Reaction	  time	  first	  estimate	  (ms)	  
2183.01	  (663.41)	   2153.83	  (578.97)	   2298.73	  (790.90)	   2303.33	  (716.04)	  
Reaction	  time	  second	  estimate	  (ms)	  
v*g	  
1762.00	  (533.63)	   1819.19	  (566.46)	   1997.20	  (648.74)	   1891.72	  (618.93)	  
Number	  of	  Trials	  
36.53	  (12.44)	   34.67	  (8.55)	   34.64	  (12.30)	   36.71	  (7.04)	  	  
Table 3.2: Control Variables. v Main effect valence, p < 0.05; g Main effect group, p < 0.05 (NB: 
there was no group difference for any of the variables); v*g Interaction effect (group x valence), p < 
0.05. 
 
3.3.2.4 Framing 
Whether participants were asked to estimate the likelihood of the events happening in the 
future, or never happening, did not alter the results. A group (MDD, healthy) by valence 
(good news/bad news) by frame (happen/not happen) ANOVA revealed the expected two-
way interaction of group by valence (F(1,27) = 4.92, p < 0.04), which is driven by controls 
updating more on good news trials than bad and MDD showing unbiased updating. 
However, there were no other significant interactions with group. Note, that reaction times 
did not differ between frames (t(28) = 0.96, p > 0.34) nor groups (t(28) = 1.09, p > 0.28) 
nor was there an interaction between group and frame (F(1,27) = 0.131, p > 0.7).  
	   75	  
3.3.3 Unbiased updating in MDD explained by adequate use and neural 
tracking of negative estimation errors 
3.3.3.1 Learning parameters 
Learning parameters for good (αG) and bad (αB) are calculated by quantifying the 
relationship, on a trial-by-trial basis for each participant, between an estimation error and 
the subsequent update (see Chapter 2). While participants learned from the information 
presented to them [mean learning parameters relating an individual’s estimation errors to 
update was significantly different from zero; t(28) = 10.79, p < 0.001], their ability to do 
so was differentially related to depression symptoms as a function of valence. Specifically, 
the greater the depression symptoms of the participant, the greater the learning parameter 
(αB) was for bad news. Learning parameters for good news (αG) were not reliably 
associated with depression symptoms (Figure 3.3). This was evident in a positive 
correlation between BDI and learning parameters in trials when participants received bad 
news (r = 0.36, p = 0.05) and no correlation between BDI and learning scores when 
receiving good news (r = -0.09, p > 0.62). The difference between these two correlations 
was statistically significant (Z = 2.17 p < 0.05, Steiger’s Z test).  
These findings suggest a likely computational principle that mediates the observed 
unbiased belief formation in depression. Specifically, they point to estimation errors as 
providing a learning signal whose impact on update depends on an interaction between 
depressed mental state and whether this new information calls for an update in a positive 
or negative direction. 
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Figure 3.3: Relationship between depression (BDI) and learning parameters (αG, αB) from 
good and bad news.  
 
3.3.3.2 fMRI data  
Given the above results I next examined the fMRI data to identify how BOLD signals 
track estimation errors in response to information that entails a belief adjustment in either 
a positive or a negative direction in depressed and healthy individuals. Absolute 
estimation errors on each trial were entered as a parametric regressor modulating the time 
point at which participants were presented with information regarding the average 
probability of events. From this analysis, first I identified regions where BOLD signal 
correlated with estimation errors for either good or bad news on a trial by trial basis across 
all participants. 
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BOLD signal correlated positively with good news estimation errors in the left 
inferior frontal gyrus (left IFG: peak voxel in Talairach coordinates: −50, 17, −4; k = 293; 
z = 4.31, Figure 3.4a) and bilateral superior frontal gyrus (bilateral SFG: -6, 60, 26; k = 
174; z = 4.01, Figure 3.4b). In addition BOLD signal correlated negatively with bad news 
estimation errors in the right inferior parietal lobule (right IPL: 65, -27, 36; k = 185; z = 
4.30, Figure 3.4c) and positively with bad news errors in Superior Temporal Gyrus (-44, -
50, 14; k = 1174; z = 4.92) and Superior Frontal Gyrus (-2, 50, 31; k = 203; z = 3.80). 
There were no voxels in which activity correlated negatively with good news estimation 
errors. These 5 ROIs comprise the entire set of regions identified in the current dataset at 
this threshold (FWE cluster level corrected after voxel-wise thresholding at p < 0.001). 
Next I examined whether the extent to which brain activity tracked estimation 
errors was related to depression. Past research (Sharot et al., 2011) has shown that brain 
regions in which BOLD signal inversely correlates with bad news estimation errors, 
predicts individual differences in trait optimism. I thus compared betas (relating BOLD 
signal to estimation errors) from the peak voxel in rIPL for participants in the MDD group 
and control group. Indeed, this revealed that BOLD response in the rIPL of depressed 
participants tracked bad news errors with greater fidelity than was the case for healthy 
controls (t(27) = -2.27, p < 0.05, Figure 3.4d; note that betas are negative, which indicate 
an inverse correlation – the larger the magnitude of the negative number, the stronger the 
relationship between BOLD signal and bad news estimation errors). 
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Figure 3.4: Brain activity tracking estimation errors. (a,b) Regions in which BOLD signal 
tracked participants’ estimation errors on a trial-by-trial basis across both groups in response 
to good news regarding future likelihoods included the left IFG (a) and bilateral SFG (b) (P 
< 0.05, FWE cluster level corrected). (c) BOLD signal tracking participants’ estimation 
errors in response to bad news was found in the right IPL (P < 0.05, FWE cluster level 
corrected). (d) Parameter estimates of the parametric regressors from peak voxels in each of 
the 3 regions tracking estimation errors. The right IPL showed a stronger inverse correlation 
between BOLD activity and bad news errors in depressed individuals relative to healthy 
individuals. Error bars represent s.e.m. *P < 0.05, two-tailed independent samples t-test.  
 
In addition, I tested for differences in the anatomically defined right IFG, as it has 
previously been found that participants with low trait optimism were more likely to have a 
negative correlation between BOLD signal and bad news estimation errors in this area in 
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the exact same task (Sharot et al., 2011). Indeed, in this dataset there was a stronger 
negative correlation between BOLD activity in the right Inferior Frontal Gyrus (rIFG) and 
bad news estimation errors in depressed patients compared to healthy controls (46, 2, 34; 
k= 27;  z = 3.87, p < 0.05 FWE, small volume corrected, betas plotted in Figure 3.5).  
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Figure 3.5: Brain activity tracking estimation errors in rIFG. Plotted are the parametric 
betas from the peak voxel (46, 2, 34) from rIFG cluster (k=27) identified by contrasting 
control group with MDD group betas and applying small volume correction across the 
anatomical rIFG (note I avoid subsequently conducting ttests as voxel selection is biased; 
betas are plotted out here for visualisation purposes only).  
 
None of the above effects can be explained by the magnitude of the estimation 
errors – as reported above these did not differ between groups. In other words, rIPL and 
rIFG representation of errors in response to bad news differentiated depressed individuals 
from healthy controls. Together, these results suggest that adequate computational 
exploitation, and representation of, negative estimation errors in depression underlies a 
relatively unbiased belief formation.  
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3.4 Discussion 
A substantial body of research now suggests that optimal mental health is associated with 
unrealistic positive beliefs regarding the self (McKay and Dennett, 2010; Taylor and 
Armor, 1996; Taylor et al., 2003). According to Bandura (Bandura, 1989), for example, if 
self-efficacy beliefs were merely to mirror what people could reasonably accomplish, 
people would seldom fail but neither would they mount the extra effort required to go 
beyond ordinary performance. If indeed biased beliefs regarding the self are adaptive, 
there should be a mechanism that promotes formation of such skewed views, one that 
could be hypothesized to be unbiased during maladaptive mental states.  
The results here show that clinically depressed participants updated their beliefs in 
proportion to the error made whether it called for updating in a desirable or undesirable 
direction, consistent with past results (Korn et al., 2013). In contrast, healthy individuals 
were less likely to update beliefs when information called for adjustment in a pessimistic 
direction. This behaviour was mediated by a diminished coding of “bad news” estimation 
errors in right IPL in healthy individuals, while depression was associated with close 
coding of negative estimation errors. These results suggest that adequate computational 
use, and representation of, negative estimation errors in depression underlies a relatively 
unbiased belief formation. The finding that mild depression may be related in some 
domains to an absence of a positive bias, rather than a presence of a negative bias also 
raises an interesting possibility for future research. Namely, testing whether the absence of 
positively biased belief updating could predict the onset of a depressive episode among 
individuals at risk for depression (see also section 7.2.1 for further discussion of this).  
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Interestingly, across groups activity increased for a better than expected outcome 
in regions tracking positive estimation errors, and dipped for a worse than expected 
outcome within right IPL. Depressed individuals were also more likely to show a pattern 
of inverse correlation between BOLD signal and bad news estimation errors in the right 
IFG than controls. One hypothesis is that this negative correlation in rIPL represents a 
“confirmation signal” such that when expectations are validated by the information 
provided (i.e. first estimations and base rates are closely aligned) there is a larger brain 
response relative to when expectations do not match up with this information. If this 
hypothesis about the functional role of rIPL is true, it suggests that when receiving bad 
news, depressed individuals make a larger distinction between instances in which this 
news conforms and instances in which it does not conform to pre-existing beliefs about 
the world. As a result, depressed individuals are potentially better able to realise the need 
to engage in learning in instances where a belief change is called for (i.e. in the absence of 
a confirmation signal). It is also of note that this pattern resembles that of dopaminergic 
neurons signalling prediction errors (Schultz et al., 1997). Indeed, it has previously been 
shown that increasing dopamine function (via administration of L-DOPA) enhances an 
update bias in healthy individuals by impairing updating from negative information even 
further (Sharot et al., 2012b). Dopamine neurons are known to project to the regions 
identified here (Fallon and Moore, 1978; Gerfen, 1992; Goldman-Rakic, 2000), and it is 
of interest that abnormal functioning of the dopaminergic system has been related to 
depression (Papakostas, 2006) and thus may underlie the lack of discounting of negative 
news observed in the disease.  
The results in this study were not explained by how well participants subsequently 
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recalled the information presented to them, as memory for the data provided did not differ 
across groups. This renders it unlikely that the findings are driven by general differences 
in cognitive or mnemonic abilities. Note also that the participants performed exactly the 
same task on trials in which they received good news and on trials in which they received 
bad news, thus valence dependent differences cannot be explained by one group having 
specific problems with percentages, generally updating less/more or any domain general 
cognitive function. Neither did the results reflect specific characteristics of events 
including familiarity with aversive events, how negative the events were perceived to be, 
how emotionally arousing participants found the events, nor their past life experience with 
the aversive events. In other words, the depressed participants did not have more 
experience with these stressful life events and so this cannot explain these results. 
These findings suggest that a positive state of mental health is linked to biased 
processing and interpretation of information in a manner that supports positively skewed 
views of the future, while depression is associated with a pattern of activity that supports 
more unbiased harvesting of information. The data, however, cannot point to causation. 
Depression may lead to more unbiased updating, or neural systems that supports more 
unbiased updating of beliefs may generate depression (see section 7.2.1 for further 
discussion of this). Furthermore, as depression progresses, and/or in more severe cases, a 
negative bias may be observed (the majority of patients in this study were moderately, 
clinically depressed).  
It has been suggested that people create positive life affirming illusions to enable 
them to cope with uncertainty and anxiety regarding future dire events (Becker, 1997; 
Varki, 2009). These illusions are particularly apparent under aversive circumstances and 
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promote resilience in such situations (Taylor et al., 1984; Wood et al., 1985). A system 
that does not allow the creation of such perceptions may promote angst and undermine 
coping strategies resulting in a downward spiral of the effect of stressful life events on 
mental health.  
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Chapter 4 
Updating Beliefs Under Threat 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The tendency to underweight bad news has significant consequences for individuals and 
society. Yet, it is unknown whether this bias is a fixed human tendency, or rather one that 
fluctuates in response to acute changes in the environment. Whilst studies have 
demonstrated that humans are more likely to integrate desirable information into self-
relevant beliefs than undesirable information (Sharot et al., 2011; Eil and Rao, 2012; 
Mobius et al., 2012; Korn et al., 2012), all have examined belief updating in relatively safe 
and non-threatening environments.  
It is possible that humans have evolved a stable pattern of updating beliefs. Indeed, 
neural function supporting the optimism bias has been related to relatively stable 
personality characteristics (Sharot et al., 2007, 2011). Another possibility however is that 
belief updating is state dependent, allowing for fluctuations in response to environmental 
demands. For example, in relatively safe surroundings, where potential harm is low, an 
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asymmetry in information integration may be prominent, leading to biased expectations 
(Johnson and Fowler, 2011). Yet in environments rife with threats, a 
physiological/psychological response may trigger changes to how information is 
integrated into beliefs. This could potentially lead to more balanced information 
integration, which may be adaptive in environments where potential costs are high. In 
support of the latter possibility, it has been shown that improving the habitat of non-
human animals leads to greater positive biases in decision-making (Matheson et al., 2008), 
while housing animals in unpredictable environments (Harding et al., 2004) or subjecting 
them to stressors on a regular basis (Rygula et al., 2013) eliminates these biases. Studies in 
humans report that when people find themselves in a threatening environment, such as 
prior to an exam (Dewberry and Richardson, 1990) or after a natural disaster (Burger and 
Palmer, 1992), or terrorist attack (Klar, Zakay and Sharvit, 2002), they show a reduction 
in optimism.  
Here, I examine whether the physiological and psychological response to a 
perceived threat results in alterations to how individuals integrate good and bad news into 
their beliefs. Participants were either exposed to a threat manipulation in the lab 
(Experiment I, manipulation condition), to a control manipulation (Experiment I, control), 
or tested in a real life environment (firefighters tested between emergency calls, 
Experiment II). After verifying that threat induced typical psychological (Experiment I & 
II) and physiological (Experiment I) changes, including changes to skin conductance, 
cortisol levels and self-ratings of state anxiety, participants completed the belief update 
task (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett and Sharot, 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 
2013; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015; Moutsiana et al., 2013, 2015; Sharot et al., 2012a, 2012b; 
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also Chapter 2). I designed the experiment such that the threat was unrelated to the 
information presented in the task. This way I could test whether the effects of perceived 
threat on information integration were general rather than specific to the threat.  
4.2 Experiment I 
4.2.1 Materials and Methods 
4.2.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-six participants recruited via the UCL subject pool participated in the study. 
Participants gave informed consent and were paid for their participation. The study was 
approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the University College London. One 
participant’s responses resulted in only two good news trials (out of a possible 40), which 
prevented a meaningful learning parameter from being calculated, thus this participant’s 
data had to be excluded. Two participant’s cortisol samples were insufficient for analysis, 
and samples of six participants who were suspected to have depression (BDI score greater 
than 10) were never sent to be analyzed. Thus analysis that includes cortisol scores is 
given for n = 27. Note, however, that either excluding those participants all together from 
all analysis or including them as done here generated the same results. Each participant 
was randomly assigned to either the threat manipulation condition (13 females, 6 males, 
mean age = 26.37 years, SD = 6.58) or the control condition (10 females, 6 males, mean 
age = 24.94 years, SD = 3.82).  
4.2.1.2 Manipulation Procedure 
	   87	  
Participants assigned to the threat manipulation were told that they would be exposed to 
an uncomfortable, stressful, event at the end of the study. Specifically, they were informed 
that at the end of the experiment they would be required to deliver a speech on a surprise 
topic, which would be recorded on video and judged live by a panel of staff members. 
They were shown an adjacent room across a double mirror window where chairs and 
tables were already organized for the panel. In addition, participants were presented with 
six difficult mathematical problems which they were asked to try and solve in 30 seconds. 
This manipulation is a variation of the Tier Social Stress Test (TSST; Birkett, 2011) with 
the main difference between the typical TSST procedure and the one used here being that 
participants were threatened by the possibility of a stressful social event, and completed 
the main task under threat, but the threat was never executed.  
Participants assigned to the control condition were informed that at the end of the 
experiment they would be required to write a short essay on a surprise topic, which would 
not be judged. They were then presented with six elementary mathematical problems to 
solve in 30 seconds.  
4.2.1.3 Manipulation Check 
I examine if the manipulation resulted in the following psychological and physiological 
changes, which are typically observed in studies using variations of TSST (Birkett, 2011). 
1. STAI-S. Before and after the induction procedure, participants filled out a short-form of 
the State scale of the Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory  (STAI-S) developed by 
Marteau and Bekker (Marteau and Bekker, 1992), see Chapter 2, section 2.4.2. 
2. Skin conductance level (SCL). SCL is an index of sympathetic tone which reflects 
changes in autonomic arousal. Skin conductance was recorded for 2 minutes pre and post 
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induction whilst participants stared at a fixation cross using disposable electrodermal gel 
electrodes (Biopac, EL507) attached to the distal phalanx of the pointer and middle fingers 
of the participants’ non-dominant hand. Skin conductance responses were monitored using 
a MP36R system (BIOPAC Systems, Inc., Goleta, CA) and analysed with BIOPAC 
software AcqKnowledge. The difference in mean SCL in each period was taken as a 
change in participants’ autonomic arousal levels.  
3. Cortisol Level. To measure changes in participants’ cortisol levels, saliva samples were 
collected using Salivette collection devices, (Salimetrics, UK). Four samples were taken at 
different time points: before the induction procedure (baseline: t0); immediately after the 
induction procedure but prior to undertaking the task (+10 min: t1); halfway through the 
task (+30min: t2); after the task and completion of post experiment questionnaires (+1hr: 
t3). The experiment was conducted between 2pm and 4pm, restricted to these times to 
control for the diurnal cycle of cortisol. Samples were stored at -80°C before being 
assayed. Analysis of salivary cortisol was completed by Salimetrics. Intra-assay and inter-
assay coefficients of variation were all below 6.1% (M = 1.5%, SD = 1.2). Cortisol values 
were measured in µg/dL. Shapiro-Wilk (SW) tests on cortisol levels at each sample period 
revealed that these were not normally distributed (one sample SW < .01 for all four 
sample intervals). As a result, cortisol values were log transformed. Change in cortisol 
levels for each participant was calculated as the difference between cortisol levels at time 
periods t1, t2 and t3 from baseline cortisol levels at t0.  
4.2.1.4 Behavioural Task 
The task was adopted from past studies (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett and Sharot, 
2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2013; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015; Moutsiana et al., 
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2013, 2015; Sharot et al., 2012a, 2012b) and outlined in Chapter 2. In this version of the 
task, participants were presented with one of the two lists (List A or List B, Table 2.1) of 
40 negative life events. The lists used were counterbalanced over participants.   
Events were presented for 3s, and participants were asked to estimate how likely 
the event was to happen to them in the future. Participants had up to 5s to respond. If the 
participant failed to respond, that trial was excluded from all subsequent analyses (M = 
1.31, SD = 1.39). Following presentation of a fixation cross (5-10s jittered) participants 
were then presented with the base rate of the event in a demographically similar 
population for 2s followed by a fixation cross (5-10s jittered). In a second session, 
immediately after the first, participants were asked again to provide estimates of their 
likelihood of encountering the same events. Base rates were not presented again in this 
second session. Note that the timings for the fixation cross are different in this version of 
the task to those used in the other chapters. This was to enable SCR responses during the 
task to be analysed in an event related manner. Since the typical SCR response occurs 
over a longer time period than BOLD response, a longer fixation period is needed to 
separate out SCR responses. 
4.2.1.5 Statistical analysis 
For each subject, I separately calculated the weight the subject put on estimation errors in 
updating their beliefs due to good news (referred to as the good news learning parameter, 
αG) using this equation: 
 
Updatet = αG * | estimation errort | 
(where t indexes trial number over good news trials)   
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and the weight the subject put on estimation errors in updating their beliefs due to bad 
news (this is referred to as bad news learning parameter, αB) using this equation: 
 
Updatet = αB * | estimation errort |  
(where t indexes trial number over bad news trials)   
 
Trials for which the estimation error was zero were excluded from subsequent analyses as 
these could not be categorized into either condition (M = 0.89 trials, SD = 0.92). Shapiro-
Wilk tests were applied to check the values of learning parameters αG and αB were 
normally distributed.  
To determine whether learning parameters for good (αG) and/or for bad (αB) news 
were affected by the threat manipulation, the learning parameters were submitted to a 2 by 
2 ANOVA with valence (good/bad news) as a repeated-measure and group (threat 
manipulation/control) as a between-subjects factor.  
To explore whether differences in learning parameters related to any of the specific 
physiological and psychological changes, I constructed a general linear model (GLM) 
with learning parameters (α) entered as the dependent variable and changes in SCL, STAI 
and cortisol as independent variables. This was done separately for good news learning 
parameters (αG) and bad news learning parameters (αB). To control for general changes in 
learning parameters and be able to detect valence-specific effects I entered αG as a 
covariate when estimating αB and vice versa (Moutsiana et al., 2013). In addition I 
controlled for priors (i.e. mean initial estimations) and mean ratings on all subjective 
scales including memory scores (Moutsiana et al., 2013). These scores correspond to good 
news trials in the GLM for αG and bad news trials in the GLM for αB. For αB the formula 
for the regression in full therefore is as follows: 
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αB = β0 + β1*Change in SCL + β2*Change in STAI + β3*Change in Cortisol + β4*Mean Initial 
Estimates + β5*Memory + β6*Mean Vividness Rating + β7*Mean Familiarity Rating + β8*Prior 
Experience  Rating + β9*Emotional Arousal Rating + β10*Negativity Rating + β11*αG 
4.2.2 Results 
Participants assigned to the threat manipulation were told that they would be exposed to 
an uncomfortable, stressful, event at the end of the study. Specifically, they were informed 
that at the end of the experiment they would be required to deliver a speech on a surprise 
topic, which would be recorded on video and judged live by a panel of staff members (for 
full details on threat and control manipulation see methods).  
Subjective reports of anxiety and physiological measures of skin conductance level 
(SCL) and cortisol show that the manipulation was effective. Specifically, following the 
manipulation self-reported anxiety (Figure 4.1a) and SCL (Figure 4.1b) showed an 
increase relative to before (baseline), which was greater in the threat manipulation group 
relative to controls (self-report anxiety: t(33) = 4.16, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [1.88, 5.50]; 
SCL: (t(33) = 3.32, p = 0.002, 95% CI = [0.56, 2.34]) with no difference in SCL drift nor 
variance between time points for the threat manipulation group (drift: t(19) = -0.62, p > 
0.25; variance: t(19) = -0.02, p > 0.25) nor for controls (drift: t(15) = 1.33, p = 0.20; 
variance: t(15) = -0.68, p > 0.25).  
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on cortisol levels at t1, t2 and t3 
relative to baseline cortisol levels (at t0). Time was entered as a 3 level repeated factor and 
group (threat/control) as a between subject factor. This revealed a main effect of time 
(F(2,48) = 8.64, p<0.01) and a trend for an effect of group (F(1,24)=2.97, p=0.098). The 
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time*group interaction was not significant (F(2,48)=1.27, p=0.29). A reduction in cortisol 
levels over time is an effect that has previously been observed as participants become 
familiar with a novel experimental context (Stones et al., 1999). That there is not a greater 
difference in cortisol levels between groups could be due to a number of reasons. It could 
be a type II error (i.e. insufficient power with the sample size to detect an effect) and/or 
the presence of additional variables that affect cortisol levels that I do not control for (e.g. 
women’s menstrual cycle). Across participants, these different measures were correlated 
with each other (Self-reported anxiety & SCL: r = 0.38, p = 0.02; SCL & Cortisol: r = 
0.47, p = 0.01; trend for Cortisol & anxiety: r = 0.33, p = 0.09).  
Figure 4.1: Manipulation Check. Changes (after manipulation – before manipulation) in (a) 
self-reported state anxiety and (b) skin conductance were greater in the threat manipulation 
group compared to the control group. (c) cortisol levels decreased over time but there was 
no difference between groups or a group*time interaction ** p < .050; Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean. 
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Examining learning parameters from the UBT, the results revealed a significant 
interaction between group (control/threat) and valence (good news/bad news) on the 
learning parameters (α), controlling for all other variables (see below): F(1,17) = 4.95, p = 
0.04, ηp2 = 0.23. Planned follow up t-tests revealed that the threat manipulation eliminated 
biased information integration (Garrett et al., 2014; Moutsiana et al., 2013; Sharot et al., 
2011). Participants in the threat manipulation group were more likely to effectively 
integrate bad news into their beliefs relative to those in the control group (significant 
difference in bad news learning parameter αB: t(33) = 2.44, p = 0.02, independent sample 
ttest), while integration of good news (αG) did not differ between groups (no significant 
difference in good news learning parameter αG: t(33) = 0.61, p > 0.25, independent sample 
ttest). Moreover, whereas I observed asymmetric information integration in the control 
group, such that the learning parameter was larger for good news than bad (t(15) = 3.34, p 
= 0.004, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.25], paired sample ttest), replicating past studies (Moutsiana et 
al., 2013; Sharot et al., 2011), this asymmetry was absent in the threat manipulation group 
(t(18) = .91, p > 0.25, 95% CI = [-0.05, 0.12], paired sample ttest; Figure 4.2). There were 
no floor (one sample ttest against a test value of 0) or ceiling (one sample ttest against a 
test value of 1) effects for αG and αB in the threat manipulation or control group (all at p < 
.001). 
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Figure 4.2: Bias in learning parameters (αG, αB) vanishes under threat manipulation. While 
the control group showed asymmetrical learning parameters (α) in response to good and bad 
news, this bias vanished in the threat manipulation group, due to an increase in αB (learning 
parameter for bad news). The Group*Valence interaction was significant, controlling for all 
covariates (see Methods). ** p < 0.05 independent/paired sample t test as appropriate; Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
Results are not driven by priors, baseline anxiety, depression symptoms, nor by 
valence-dependent effects on memory, attention, emotional arousal, negative valence, 
vividness, familiarity, past experience, RTs. The following covariates were included in the 
ANOVA above: initial STAI, initial SCL, participants’ priors (i.e. initial estimates of 
likelihoods), differential rating scores for good news and bad news trials on all scales 
(emotional arousal, negative valence, vividness, familiarity, past experience), differential 
RTs, BDI scores, standard deviation of the criterion and of the predictor of the learning 
parameter. In addition, to test memory for the information presented (rather than 
information integration), subjects were asked to provide the base rate presented to them of 
each event. Memory errors were calculated as the absolute difference between the base 
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rate and the participants’ recollection of that statistic (as done before: see methods). 
Memory bias (i.e. the difference between memory errors for good and bad news) was 
added as a covariate. As all these variables were included in the ANOVA for which 
statistics are provided in the previous section, none of them can explain these results. 
Moreover, none of these factors showed a significant interaction between valence and 
group (see Table 4.1 for statistics on all covariates).  
Past studies show that asymmetric information integration in this task is not 
associated with an asymmetry in memory. However, to be certain that memory did not 
affect the results here either, I not only added memory scores as a covariate in all the 
analysis but also submitted memory scores to a group (threat manipulation/control) by 
valence (good news/ bad news) ANOVA, which did not reveal an interaction (F(1,33) = 
0.62, p > 0.25). Thus, valence dependent changes in learning parameters across groups 
(i.e. how participants use information to update beliefs regarding personal risk) cannot be 
attributed to memory or encoding/attention. Note that while information can be better or 
worse than expected, all stimuli are negative (i.e. robbery, card fraud), thus comparison is 
never between positive and negative stimuli, but rather between information that is better 
or worse than expected.  
 Threat Group mean 
(SD) 
Control Group mean 
(SD) 
Questionnaire and variables 
Good 
News 
Bad 
News 
Good 
News 
Bad 
News 
Subjective Scales Questionnaire 
 1 = low to 6 = high     Vividness*  3.37 (.75) 
2.96 
(.60) 
3.72 
(.79) 
3.00 
(.70) 
Familiarity* 3.74 (.99) 
3.43 
(.75) 
4.31 
(.75) 
3.82 
(.99) 
Prior experience*  1.75 (.65) 
1.57 
(.69) 
1.69 
(.44) 
1.37 
(.30) 
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Emotional arousal 3.55 (.74) 
3.21 
(.71) 
3.56 
(.98) 
3.44 
(.75) 
Negativity 4.05 (.52) 
3.85 
(.62) 
3.97 
(.86) 
4.10 
(.67) 
Task-related variables     
Number of Trials 18.16 (4.32) 
19.74 
(4.76) 
18.00 
(5.10) 
19.56 
(4.73) 
Memory errors 9.06 (2.10) 
10.29 
(3.01) 
10.36 
(3.42) 
10.57 
(3.38) 
Estimation errors (absolute) 18.87 (5.15) 
19.69 
(3.34) 
18.05 
(4.85) 
16.94 
(2.86) 
Reaction time first estimate (ms)* 2742.88 (502.70) 
2908.69 
(521.98) 
2606.70 
(635.29) 
2649.01 
(624.72) 
Reaction time second estimate (ms)* 2266.81 (545.52) 
2200.15 
(541.02) 
2294.33 
(478.73) 
2174.91 
(404.10) 
Table 4.1: Task-related variables, subjective scales, memory and reaction times in 
Experiment I. * Main effect valence, p < 0.05 
 
Together, these results indicate that threat in the environment selectively enhances 
the ability to adjust beliefs in response to bad news. 
What therefore could account for the selective fluctuations in information 
integration of bad news? To examine which of the changes to the psychological and 
physiological measures (SCL, cortisol level, self-reported anxiety) could independently 
explain alteration in learning parameters for bad news, a linear regression was performed 
with αB entered as the dependent variable and changes in STAI, SCL, and cortisol as 
independent variables (all entered together in one regression). To ensure that effects were valence-specific and could not be accounted for by general changes to information 
integration, αG was added as a covariate. I also controlled for priors (i.e. mean initial 
estimations) and mean ratings on all subjective scales including memory scores. The 
analysis revealed that changes in self-reported anxiety indicated by STAI (t = 2.26, p = 
0.04, bi = 0.028, ηp2 = 0.25) and physiological arousal indicated by SCL (t = 2.11, p = 
0.05, bi = 0.057, ηp2 = 0.23) explained the variance in integration parameters for bad news, 
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but cortisol did not (t = -0.56, p > 0.25, bi = -0.04, ηp2 =  0.02; see Table 4.2 for parameter 
estimates of covariates). Specifically, participants who showed the greatest increase in 
SCL and self-reported anxiety were most likely to change their beliefs in proportion to the 
difference between their prior and the bad news received (Figure 4.3). This pattern of 
results remains if BDI is added as an additional covariate in the regression. Note that the 
null result for cortisol may indicate either that the increase in bad news information 
integration is not associated specifically with cortisol level increase, or a Type II error. For 
completeness I repeated the analysis on αG (including αB and all other factors as 
covariates) and found no significant effects (change in STAI: t = -0.18, p > 0.25, bi = -
0.003, ηp2 = 0.00; change in SCL: t = 0.96, p > 0.25, bi = 0.034, ηp2 = .06; change in 
cortisol:  t = 0.23, p > 0.25, bi = .018, ηp2 = 0.00). 
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Figure 4.3: Greater integration of bad news related to state anxiety and SCL. Following the 
manipulation, an increase in both a. self-reported state anxiety (bi = .028, p = 0.039, ηp2 = 
0.25) and b. skin conductance (SCL) (bi = .057, p = 0.052, ηp2 = 0.23) were related to larger 
bad news learning parameters (αB). Plotted are the standardized learning parameters for bad 
news, αB, from a linear model that also includes: learning parameters for good news (αG), 
initial estimates (priors), mean ratings on all subjective scales, memory scores, changes in 
cortisol and changes in skin conductance (in the case of plot a) and changes in self-reported 
anxiety (in the case of plot b).  
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  bi 
Std. 
Error t p 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
ηp2 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Mean Initial Estimations .01 .01 .69 .498 -.01 .02 .03 
Memory .00 .02 -.18 .860 -.04 .03 .00 
Vividness rating  -.06 .06 -.99 .340 -.19 .07 .06 
Familiarity rating .07 .05 1.62 .125 -.02 .17 .15 
Prior experience rating  -.07 .07 -1.01 .330 -.21 .08 .06 
Emotional arousal rating -.13 .05 -2.52 .023 -.24 -.02 .30 
Negativity rating -.02 .08 -.29 .775 -.19 .14 .01 
Learning parameter, 
good news (αG) 
.35 .17 2.01 .063 -.02 .72 .21 
Table 4.2: Parameter estimates of covariates in Experiment I. Priors (i.e. mean initial 
estimations), mean ratings on all subjective scales, memory scores and αG (learning 
parameters for good news) were entered as covariates to account for fluctuations in αB 
(learning parameters for bad news).  
4.3 Experiment II  
Next I set out to extend the findings from Experiment I in a natural setting. Here, I did not 
manipulate threat. Rather, I measured the relationship between integration of good and 
bad news and perceived threat in a naturally volatile environment. Specifically, 
firefighters from the state of Colorado performed the UBT while on duty at their 
respective fire stations.  
4.3.1 Materials and Methods 
4.3.1.1 Participants 
Thirty three operational staff stationed across seventeen fire stations within the South 
Metro Fire and Rescue Authority of the State of Colorado in the United States participated 
in the study. Five of these participants failed to complete the study leaving 28 participants 
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(1 female, 27 males, mean age = 42.75 years, SD = 9.75). A link to an online version of 
the experiment was sent by email to operational staff inviting them to participate in the 
study whilst on duty. Employees were given 18 days to attempt the experiment. They were 
permitted to take the experiment once in this time period and were explicitly requested to 
do so whilst on shift (i.e. in the station between calls). Participation in the experiment was 
anonymous and voluntary and participants were not paid.  
4.3.1.2 Task, stimuli and control variables 
An online version of the UBT used in Experiment I was designed using Qualtrics Survey 
Software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). The task began by asking basic demographic questions 
(age, gender, marital status, level of education and number of children) and some 
questions pertaining to their work (including how long they had worked in the service, 
how many people they supervised, number of emergency they went on, what their rank in 
the service was) and social environment (social support at work and outside, and stress 
experienced at home). 
After providing this information, participants read task instructions on screen at 
their own pace and then undertook a practice session comprising 3 practice trials. The task 
was the same as in Experiment I, except that some of the descriptions were adapted for 
language differences between American English and British English (for example the 
abbreviation “ER” replaced the term “A&E”). Furthermore, mindful of the firefighters’ 
unpredictable time constraints, memory for the information given and subjective ratings 
(past experience with the event and negativity) were elicited for half the stimuli and 
participants completed a short version of the state scale of the STAI at the beginning of 
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the study (Chlan et al., 2003), without providing physiological measures of autonomic 
arousal.  
Statistical analysis: Linear regressions were performed using ordinary least squares 
implemented using SPSS version 22 for bad news and good news separately, with learning 
parameters (αG and αB) entered as the dependent variable and self-reported anxiety as the 
independent variable. To ensure that effects were valence specific and could not be 
accounted for by general changes to information integration, learning parameters for good 
news (αG) were added as a covariate when examining learning parameters for bad news 
(αB) and vice versa. For each condition I also controlled for priors, memory, mean ratings 
of negativity and mean ratings of past experience as done in Experiment 1. For αB the 
formula for the regression in full therefore is as follows: 
 
αB = β0 + β1*Anxiety + β2*Mean Initial Estimates + β3*Memory + β4*Prior Experience  Rating 
+ β5*Negativity Rating +  β6*αG 
 
4.3.2 Results 
The results of Experiment II expanded the results of Experiment I in a “real life” context. 
Specifically, a linear regression was carried out in which learning parameters for bad news 
(αB) were regressed on self-reported anxiety, controlling for priors (i.e. mean initial 
estimations) and mean ratings on subjective scales including memory scores. In addition, 
to ensure effects were valence-specific and could not be accounted for by general changes 
in learning parameters, αG was added as a covariate. This analysis revealed that self-
reported anxiety significantly explained the variance in αB (t = 3.96, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.43, 
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bi = 0.054, 95% CI = [0.026, 0.082]; Figure 4.4 and Table 4.3). Thus, the higher the 
anxiety reported by a firefighter, the more likely the firefighter was to integrate bad news 
into beliefs in proportion to the difference between her/his priors and the information 
given. This pattern of results remains if BDI is added as an additional covariate in the 
regression. Next I conducted the same analysis on learning parameters for good news (αG, 
with αB and all other factors added as covariates). This revealed a trend in the opposite 
direction than for αB (t = -1.92, p = 0.07, ηp2 = 0.117, bi = -0.045, 95% CI = [-0.094, 
0.004]), such that greater anxiety was related to a trend for less information integration in 
response to good news. There were no floor or ceiling effects for αG or αB (all at p < .001). 
Hence, the results indicate that anxiety is related to a selective enhancement of the 
ability to adjust beliefs in response to bad news. I selected to test firefighters on duty as I 
reasoned that these individuals may exhibit a large range of state anxiety due to the 
volatility of their working environment. I emphasize, however, that the results are not 
necessarily contingent on the environment being volatile, nor are anxiety levels 
necessarily a result of their work environment.  
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Figure 4.4: State anxiety in firefighters related to greater integration of bad news. State 
anxiety levels of firefighters (bi = 0.054, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.43) whilst on shift were related to 
larger bad news learning parameters (αB). Plotted are the standardized αB from a linear 
model that also includes initial estimates (priors), mean ratings on subjective scales, 
memory scores and learning parameters for good news (αG).  
 
  
 
 
 bi 
Std. 
Error t p 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
ηp2 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Mean Initial Estimations -0.002 0.006 -0.301 0.766 -0.014 0.011 0.004 
Memory 0.018 0.011 1.67 0.11 -0.004 0.039 0.117 
Prior experience rating  -0.059 0.082 -0.721 0.479 -0.229 0.111 0.024 
Negativity rating 0.105 0.053 1.965 0.063 -0.006 0.215 0.155 
Learning parameter, 
good news (αG) 0.426 0.123 3.461 0.002 0.17 0.682 0.363 
Table 4.3: Parameter estimates of covariates in Experiment II. Priors (i.e. mean initial 
estimations), mean ratings on subjective scales, memory scores and αG (learning parameters 
for good news) were entered as covariates to account for fluctuations in αB (learning 
parameters for bad news).  
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4.4 Discussion  
Together, these results provide evidence that asymmetry in belief formation is absent 
under perceived threat. Specifically, Experiment I shows that in a low threat environment 
individuals integrated information asymmetrically, faithfully incorporating good news into 
their existing beliefs while relatively disregarding bad news (Eil and Rao, 2011; Sharot et 
al., 2011). Under perceived threat, however, this asymmetry disappeared; participants 
showed an increased capacity to integrate bad news into prior beliefs. Increased 
physiological arousal and state anxiety were found to correlate with enhanced integration 
of unfavourable information into beliefs. The latter result was then replicated in 
firefighters, who often experience real life threat and on duty. 
Given that enhanced information integration for bad news under threat was valence 
specific (i.e. observed only for bad news while controlling for any variance in information 
integration of good news), it could not reflect a general improvement in information 
integration. Furthermore, the effect on belief formation was selective and did not affect 
the evaluation of the stimuli presented (including emotional evaluation of the stimuli, 
sense of familiarity and vividness) or memory for the information presented. The latter 
suggests that modulation of attention is an unlikely explanation. Depression scores were 
also controlled for in the analysis reported thus differences in depression symptoms cannot 
account for the results. 
 It is also of interest that in the studies reported here, the source of the threat was 
unrelated to the information in the task. Thus, state anxiety had a valence-specific, yet 
general, effect on how participants used information to alter their beliefs (i.e. in response 
to a social threat the participants did not selectively increase their response to information 
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about social judgment, but to negative information in general). This may be adaptive, as 
threat may signify a dangerous environment that requires a general enhancement of 
caution. However, in situations where perceived anxiety is chronically high one would 
predict prolonged balanced information integration and thus an absence of optimism bias. 
For example, in depression, anxiety is often prolonged, and both balanced information 
integration (Garrett et al., 2014 and Chapter 3) and lack of optimism (Strunk et al., 2006) 
are observed. Taken together, it is possible that in individuals predisposed to affective 
disorders, a stressful life event can result in prolonged levels of anxiety and thus 
prolonged periods of increased sensitivity to negative information. This in turn will form 
pessimistic beliefs, which will lead to greater perceived threat. 
In sum, these results provide evidence that asymmetric information integration is 
not set in stone, but changes acutely in response to the environment, decreasing under 
perceived threat. Such flexibility could be adaptive, potentially enhancing our likelihood 
to respond to warnings with caution in environments where future costs may be high, but 
enabling us to maintain positive beliefs otherwise, a strategy that has been suggested, on 
balance, to increase well-being (McKay and Dennett, 2010).  
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Chapter 5 
How Robust is the Optimistic Update Bias for 
Estimating Self-risk and Population Base 
Rates? 
 
5.1 Introduction 
An open question is whether the update bias exists only when adjusting beliefs about the 
self or whether it is observed also when adjusting beliefs about the population at large 
(base rates). This is important for understanding biases in risk estimation for two reasons. 
First, when estimating own risk people may incorporate both base rates and diagnostic 
information in their calculations. For example, if someone is estimating their likelihood of 
cancer they may consider the known frequency in their population together with 
knowledge about themselves (i.e. do I smoke? do I exercise?). Thus, a bias in updating 
base rates may effect updating for self-risk. Second, it has been suggested that people tend 
to be optimistically biased when considering the self, less so when considering others 
(Weinstein, 1980). It is thus of interest to examine whether or not the optimistic updating 
bias previously found for self risk will expand to base rates.  
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To examine selective updating in estimating risk about oneself and the population I 
adjusted the UBT (see Experimental Methods, Chapter 2). Participants completed a 
revised version of the UBT where they estimated their own risk for 80 different negative 
events and also estimated the base rates of these events. On each trial they were then given 
explicit information regarding the base rates, and in a second session they estimated both 
again (see Figure 5.1a, procedure). The rationale in examining how participants update 
their estimates of base rates when receiving this information from the experimenter is that 
although a participant may recall the base rate presented accurately s/he may be uncertain 
of the validity of that information. For example, they may believe they have 
additional/more-up-to-date information regarding base rates that the experimenter does not 
know about. Thus when the participant incorporates the new information into his/her 
existing beliefs they may still do so in a biased manner. 
The paradigm enabled quantification of how participants adjust their beliefs about 
the self and the population in response to new information in two instances: (1) when they 
learn that the average likelihood of encountering a negative life event is lower than their 
own estimates (good news, Figure 5.1b) and (2) when it is greater (bad news, Figure 
5.1c). To examine the robustness of the bias I further investigated if the results differ if 
valence is empirically defined in two different ways: (1) by comparing the information 
presented to the participants’ estimate of their own probability of encountering a negative 
event; (2) by comparing the information presented to the participants’ estimate of the 
population base rate. By asking participants to rate the extent to which they found the 
information presented to them desirable or undesirable I could also examine whether these 
subjective ratings are driven more or less by deviations from: (1) estimations of self risk 
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(2) estimations of the population base rate. Finally, additional experimental factors that 
may influence the results (such as memory for the information provided and priors) were 
tested. 
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Figure 5.1: Paradigm. (a) In each trial, participants were presented with a short description 
of 1 of 80 adverse events and asked to estimate how likely this event was to occur to 
themselves in the future and how likely the event was to happen on average in the 
population. They were then presented with the base rate in a demographically similar 
population. Finally, participants were asked to rate how negative/positive they found this 
information. The second session was the same as the first except that the base rate was not 
presented and participants did not submit any ratings. Examples of trials in which the 
participant’s estimate of the event occurring to themselves and the base rate was (b) higher 
or (c) lower than the provided base rate. In the specific examples shown here, under either 
classification scheme therefore these trials would be categorized as good news and bad news 
trials respectively.  
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5.2 Materials and Methods 
5.2.1 Participants 
The study was approved by the UCL Psychology Ethics Committee. Written informed 
consent was obtained from all participants. Thirty-two participants aged 18 to 33 
participated in the study (mean age = 22.93; s.d. = 3.64). An additional six participants 
originally completed the task but were excluded due to BDI Scores above 11, indicating 
possible major depression disorder. All participants were recruited from UCL psychology 
subject pool. Participants were paid for their participation.  
5.2.2 Task and Procedure 
5.2.2.1 Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of eighty short descriptions of adverse life events (e.g. passenger in a car 
accident, home burglary – see Experimental Methods, Chapter 2, Table 2.1).  
5.2.2.1 Procedure 
The paradigm was modified from previous studies (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett et al., 
2014; Moutsiana et al., 2013, 2015; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a, 2012b) and that described 
in Experimental Methods, Chapter 2. The version used in this experiment is depicted in 
Figure 5.1.  
In this version of the task, participants were asked to separately estimate how 
likely each event was to happen to themselves in the future and how likely the event was 
to happen on average in the population. In half of the trials the order of these estimations 
was reversed (i.e. participants were first asked to estimate how likely the event was to 
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happen on average and then to estimate their own likelihood). Participants were then 
shown the actual frequency of the event in a demographically similar population for 2s. 
Finally, participants were asked to rate on a 7 point scale (1=Very negative; 7 = Very 
Positive) how negative/positive they found this information. Participants had up to 6s to 
give each estimation and rating. If the participant failed to submit a response for either 
estimation or rating, that trial was excluded from all consequent analyses (mean trials with 
missing response = 2.50, s.d. = 2.78).  
In a second session, immediately after the first, participants were asked again to 
provide estimates of their likelihood and the average likelihood of encountering the same 
events (order reversed in half the trials) so that it could be assessed how they updated both 
estimations regarding the self and estimations regarding base rates.  
5.2.3 Data Analysis 
5.2.3.1 Classification, Updates and Bayesian Comparison 
Trials were divided into ones in which participants received good or bad news using 2 
different classification criteria: 
1. Trials were classified as in previous studies (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Korn et al., 
2013; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015; Moutsiana et al., 2013, 2015; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a, 
2012b) and as described in Experimental Methods, Chapter 2. Trials were classified as 
good news when the participant initially overestimated the probability of the event 
occurring to themselves relative to the provided base rate. Conversely, trials were 
classified as bad news when the participant initially underestimated the probability of the 
event occurring to themselves relative to the provided base rate. Trials in which 
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participants’ estimates of their own likelihood were exactly equal to the provided base rate 
were excluded from the analysis (mean number excluded trials = 1.72; s.d. = 1.25).  
2. Trials were classified as good news when the participant initially overestimated the 
base rate relative to the provided base rate. Trials were classified as bad news when the 
participant underestimated the base rate relative to the provided base rate. Trials in which 
participants’ estimates of the base rate were exactly equal to the provided base rate were 
excluded from the analysis (mean number excluded trials = 1.53; s.d. = 1.02). 
For both of these classifications, update terms were calculated as described in Chapter 2 
only there are now two update terms for each type of information: one for self risk and 
one for base rate. So for good news trials were calculated as: 
UpdateSelf_Risk = First_EstimationSelf_Risk −Second_EstimationSelf_Risk  
UpdateBase_Rate = First_EstimationBase_Rate −Second_EstimationBase_Rate  
For bad news trials, update terms were calculated as: 
Self_RiskSelf_RiskSelf_Risk mationFirst_EstiimationSecond_EstUpdate −=  
Base_RateBase_RateBase_Rate mationFirst_EstiimationSecond_EstUpdate −=  
For each type of update (Self_Risk/Base_Rate) and classification scheme, update scores 
were entered into separate ANOVAs and follow up t-tests were conducted. In addition, a 
Bayesian analysis was conducted to assess the degree to which updating for Self Risk 
corresponded to that of a Bayesian agent under each classification method. This is 
described below.  
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Bayes theorem (Bayes and Price, 1763; Stuart, 1994) suggests that participants 
estimate how likely an event is to occur given the available evidence for and against the 
event. In instances where one examines the evidence for two competing statements (e.g. 
that an event will happen vs  not happen), the theorem can be formalised (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1973) as: 
! ℎ ! = ! ! ! ℎ !×!!(ℎ)! ! ℎ !×!! ℎ + !! ! ~ℎ !×!!(~ℎ)  
Using this formulation, when estimating how likely an event is, such as how likely 
one is to be burgled in the future, given the evidence for and against the event occurring in 
the future, one would estimate:  
(1) What the average burglary rate is, say in the neighbourhood, the prior: P(h). 
Note that in these instances where events are binary (you are either burgled or not 
burgled), the prior of the event not happening (P(~h)) will be given by: 1-P(h).   
(2) The degree of evidence (e), given that the proposition (h, being burgled in this 
example) is true (P(e/h)) versus the degree of evidence (e) given that the 
proposition (h) is false (P(e/~h)). This can be expressed as a likelihood ratio 
(LHR): P(e/h) / P(e/~h) 
(3) Finally, (1) and (2) can then be integrated to arrive at an estimate of how likely 
the event is to happen given the evidence for and against (P(h/e)), using the 
formula above.	  	  
In the design used here, participants are asked to provide estimates of priors, P(h), 
for each event along with estimates of their own likelihood of experiencing each event 
which, if it is assumed that participants arrive at through a process of Bayesian integration, 
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can be construed as P(h/e). Hence we have 2 of the 3 pieces of the Bayesian equation, the 
missing one being the likelihood ratio. A recent analysis (Shah et al., 2016) has shown that 
an “odds ratio” formulation of the Bayes rule equation above (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1973; Shah et al., 2016) can be rearranged to calculate the likelihood ratio participants are 
implied to have used given their priors and self estimates. The formula and analysis is 
originally described in Shah et al. (2016) but I restate it briefly here. The odds ratio form 
of Bayes rule (presented in Shah et al., 2016) is:  
Posterior Odds = Prior Odds X LHR 
 
Where LHR is the likelihood ratio. Formally this is expressed as:  !(ℎ/!)1− !(ℎ/!)! = ! !(ℎ)1− !(ℎ) !×!!"# 	   
This can be rearranged to find the likelihood ratio participants are implied to have used to 
arrive at their estimate of P(h/e) given their prior P(h). Specifically: 
!"#! = !(ℎ/!)1− !(ℎ/!)÷ ! !(ℎ)1− !(ℎ)  
 
Expressing this in terms of measures in the UBT (where P(h/e) is assumed to be 
participants’ first estimates of their own risk and P(h) participants first estimates of base 
rates): 
!"#! = !"#$%_!"#$%&#$'(!"#$_!"#$1− !"#$%_!"#$%&#$'(!"#$_!"#$÷ ! !"#$%_!"#$%&#$'(!"#$_!"#$1− !!"#$_!"#$%&#$'(!"#$_!"#$  
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Following Shah et al. (2016), once this implied likelihood ratio has been calculated, it is 
then possible to compare participants update behavior to a rational Bayesian agent by 
calculating what a Bayesian posterior would be: 
Posterior Odds = Prior Odds * LHR 
 
Where Prior Odds are given by: 
Prior Odds = Base rate/(1-Base Rate) 
 
Converting Posterior Odds to a percentage is then derived by dividing Posterior Odds by 
(1+ Posterior Odds). Hence a Bayesian 2nd estimate is given by: 
Bayesian 2nd Estimate = Posterior Odds/(1+Posterior Odds) 
 
From this, Bayesian Update is calculated for desirable trials as:  
Bayesian Update = First_EstimationSelf_Risk – Bayesian 2nd Estimate 
 
For undesirable trials, Bayesian Update is calculated as: 
Bayesian Update = Bayesian 2nd Estimate - First_EstimationSelf_Risk 
 
Finally, to assess how well participants’ actual updates correspond to a Bayesian update, 
Bayesian updates can be regressed on actual update of participants and the resulting 
regression coefficients examined at the group level (a similar approach is taken in Eil and 
Rao, 2011).  
To summarise, this analysis proceeds in four steps: 
(1) Calculate implied likelihood ratio using estimate of own likelihood and base rate 
estimate. 
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(2) Calculate “Bayesian” 2nd estimate and update using implied likelihood ratio and 
base rate provided to participant.  
(3) Compare actual update to Bayesian update by regressing Bayesian update on 
actual update separately for good and bad news for each participant.  
(4) Compare regression coefficients at the group level (i.e. across participants). 
5.2.3.2 Desirability Ratings 
On each trial, after being provided with base rates, participants were asked to rate on a 7 
point scale (1=Very negative; 7 = Very Positive) how negative/positive they found this 
information. To test whether these desirability ratings were driven more or less by the 
extent to which the statistical information differed from participants’ estimations 
regarding the self or regarding base rates, two estimation error terms quantifying for each 
trial the difference between participants’ initial estimates and the information presented 
were calculated as: 
ase_RateProvided_BmateFirst_Esti_ErrorEstimation Self_RiskSelf_Risk −=  
Estimation_ErrorBase_Rate = First_EstimateBase_Rate −Provided_Base_Rate  
 
For each participant, each set of estimation errors was correlated with their 
desirability ratings. To statistically test for a difference in the strength of these correlations 
accounting for the additional correlation between the 2 sets of estimation errors these were 
compared these using Steiger's Z-test. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Do participants update in a Bayesian manner? 
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Ascertaining estimates of participants’ own likelihood and base rate estimates allows 
calculation of what a Bayesian update would be on each trial. To assess the degree of 
correspondence between Bayesian updates and participants’ actual updates for self risk, 
linear regressions were carried out with Bayesian Update for self risk as the independent 
variable and participants’ actual update for self risk as the dependent variable. This was 
run for each participant for good news and bad news separately and under each 
classification scheme. Slopes indicate the degree to which participants’ updates 
correspond to that of a Bayesian update. Under classification one and classification two, 
there was a tighter correspondence between Bayesian update and subjects actual update 
for good news compared to bad news (Figure 5.2), consistent with previous studies (Eil 
and Rao, 2011; Mobius et al., 2012). 
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Figure 5.2: For each participant, on each trial the update a Bayesian agent would undertake 
was calculated. I then examined the extent to which participants’ actual update 
corresponded to Bayesian agents. Under each classification method, participants’ update 
showed a stronger relationship with a Bayesian agent when they received good news 
compared to when they received bad news. * indicates significantly different, paired sample 
t-test (P < 0.05). 
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5.3.2 Is updating beliefs regarding personal risk and base rates biased? 
As detailed below, these results show biased updating for self risk (see Figure 5.3). 
Specifically, updating for self risk is greater in response to good news relative to bad news 
under both classification schemes of desirability. However, for base rates biased updating 
can be accounted for by priors.  
5.3.2.1 Updating of personal risk 
Replicating previous findings (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Moutsiana et 
al., 2013, 2015; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a, 2012b), classification scheme 1 revealed that 
participants updated their beliefs regarding self risk more when the information regarding 
base rates was better than their estimate of self risk compared to when it was worse (t(31) 
= 6.09, P < 0.01). This bias persists under classification 2 when classifying desirability of 
information as dependent on base rates (i.e. if information regarding base rates is greater 
or smaller than participants’ estimate of these base rates). Participants were more likely to 
update their beliefs about their own likelihood of encountering a negative life event when 
the base rate was better than their initial estimate of the base rate compared to trials in 
which the base rate was worse (t(31) = 4.83, P < 0.01). These results replicate previous 
findings of valence dependent updating studies (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett et al., 
2014; Moutsiana et al., 2013, 2015; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a, 2012b) and confirm that 
valence dependent updating for self risk is not contingent on classification scheme.  
 As detailed below, these findings hold after accounting for possible confounding 
factors. Specifically, as I describe in section 5.3.2.3, examining all additional factors and 
ratings revealed four possible confounds: (1) under classification 1 ratings of past 
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experience differed for stimuli for which subjects received good and bad news; (2) under 
classification 2 magnitude of estimation errors differed for stimuli for which subjects 
received good and bad news; (3) under classification 2 there were a greater number of 
trials for which subjects received good news than bad news (4) initial estimates of 
personal risk and base rates differed (this is true for both classifications).  
 In these instances where confounds were identified, mean update scores for each 
participant were entered into a repeat measures ANOVA with valence (good/bad news) as 
a factor and the relevant scores added as covariates. In the case of past experience, the 
covariate was the mean difference between past experience for good news trials and past 
experience for bad news trials for each participant. For estimation errors, the covariate was 
the average difference in estimation errors for good news trials and bad news trial for each 
participant. For number of trials the covariate was the difference in number of good news 
and bad news trials for each participant. For initial estimates, the covariate was simply the 
mean initial estimate for each participant.  
 When controlling for these additional factors in the respective classifications a 
main effect of valence remained (classification 1: F(29) = 8.02, P<0.01, classification 2: 
F(29) = 10.72, P<0.01) confirming the robustness of the bias.  
5.3.2.2 Updating of base rates 
Participants updated their beliefs about the base rate more when the presented base rate 
was better than their estimate of self risk, compared to trials in which the base rate was 
worse (i.e. classification 1: t(31) = 5.58, P < 0.01) and also when the actual base rate was 
better than their initial estimate of this base rate compared to when it was worse (i.e. 
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classification 2: t(31) = 2.43, P<0.03). As detailed below, however, the finding is 
abolished under classification two when accounting for priors.  
Specifically, as I describe in section 5.3.2.3, examining all additional factors and 
ratings revealed four possible confounds: (1) under classification 1 ratings of past 
experience differed for stimuli for which subjects received good and bad news; (2) under 
classification 1 and 2 magnitude of estimation errors differed for stimuli for which 
subjects received good and bad news; (3) under classification two the number of trials for 
which subjects initially overestimated the base rate and thus received good news was 
greater than the number of trials in which they underestimated it and thus received bad 
news; (4) initial estimates of personal risk and base rates differed (this is true for both 
classifications). In these instances where confounds were identified, mean update scores 
for each participant were entered into a repeat measures ANOVA with valence (good/bad 
news) as a factor and the relevant scores added as covariates.  
When controlling for these additional factors in the respective classifications a 
main effect remained under classification 1 (F(29) = 4.59, p<0.05), but not 2 (F(29) = 
0.64, p>0.4). Looking at the latter in detail revealed that biased updating of base rates was 
mostly contingent on the differences in the number of trials for which subjects received 
good news and bad news. With that covariate alone, biased updating for base rates was 
abolished (F(29) = 2.37, p>0.13 ). Without it the effect remained (F(29) = 4.12 p = 0.05).  
5.3.2.3 Control variables 
Below I detail examination of any experimental factors (i.e. memory, familiarity, past 
experience, perceived negativity, estimation errors, priors, number of trials) that might 
differ for trials in which subjects received good and bad news. I do this under both 
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classification schemes and for both estimations of self risk and base rates. As I described 
in the results reported in sections 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.2.2, update bias was re-examined after 
controlling for any differences found in these variables.   
Memory: Participants remembered information presented to them equally well, 
irrespective of whether it was good or bad news and irrespective of whether good and bad 
news was classified according to method 1 (t(31) = 0.68, P > 0.50) or method 2 (t(31) 
=0.01, P > 0.99).  
Note that a participant may recall the base rate presented accurately but be 
uncertain of the validity of that information. For example, they may believe they have 
additional/more-up-to-date information regarding base rates that the experimenter does not 
know about. Thus recollection of these numbers and the participant’s second estimate of 
the base rate may differ. Comparing these two scores (i.e. recollection of base rates 
presented and second estimation of base rates) revealed they were not significantly 
different from each other, but there was a trend towards recollection of base rates being 
slightly higher than second estimation of base rates (t(31)=-1.76, p=0.09).   
Familiarity, perceived negativity, past experience: Questionnaire scores revealed 
that participants did not rate events for which they received good and bad news as 
differing in familiarity (i.e. how familiar they are with the stimuli from friends, family TV 
etc.) or negativity (how negative they perceive the event to be) under either classification 
method (see Table 5.1). However, under classification one participants rated events for 
which they received good news as greater on past experience compared to events in which 
they received bad news (t(31) = 3.02, P<0.01). This difference was controlled for in the 
results reported in 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.2.2 by calculating for each participant the difference in 
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mean past experience ratings for good and bad news trials. These difference scores were 
then added as a covariate in a repeated measures ANOVA with valence (good/bad news) 
as a repeated factor and mean update scores as the dependent variable.   
Priors (first estimates and number of trials): In accordance with past research (e.g. 
see Weinstein, 1980), participants believed their own likelihood of encountering a 
negative event was lower than their estimate of the base rate (initial estimate of self risk 
was lower than estimated base rate (t(31)=-4.30, P<0.01). This was observed in 84% of 
the participants, suggesting they believed they would fare better than average.  
Furthermore, under classification 2 they would often overestimate the base rate 
relative to the base rate presented to them, such that the number of trials in which they 
received good news regarding base rates was larger than for bad news (i.e. ratio of good 
news trials to all trials was larger than 0.5 t(31) = 4.93, p<0.01). There were no significant 
differences in the number of trials in which they received good and bad news for self risk. 
These differences were controlled for in the results reported in sections 5.3.2.1 and 
5.3.2.2. 
	  	   Classification	  1,	  mean	  (SD)	   Classification	  2,	  mean	  (SD)	  
Questionnaire	  and	  variables	   Good	  News	   Bad	  News	   Good	  News	   Bad	  News	  
Subjective	  Scales	  Questionnaire:	  All	  
scales	  1	  =	  low	  to	  6	  =	  high	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Familiarity	   4.05	  (1.04)	   3.93	  (1.16)	   3.99	  (1.09)	   3.97	  (1.16)	  
Prior	  experience	   1.39	  (0.37)*	   1.23	  (0.33)*	   1.28	  (0.31)	   1.33	  (0.36)	  
Negativity	   3.97	  (0.85)	   4.09	  (0.92)	   4.05	  (0.88)	   4.00	  (0.91)	  
Task-­‐related	  variables	  
	   	   	   	  
Number	  of	  Trials	   36.75	  (13.60)	   39.03	  (12.66)	   45.38	  (8.90)*	   30.59	  (8.35)*	  
Memory	  errors	   14.06	  (5.89)	   13.46	  (3.81)	   13.83	  (5.91)	   13.82	  (4.10)	  
Initial	  estimate	  self	  risk	   44.28	  (6.83)*	   19.30	  (5.28)*	   35.79	  (9.03)*	   24.47	  (8.05)*	  
Initial	  estimate	  base	  rates	   41.97	  (5.80)*	   29.40	  (5.17)*	   41.94	  (5.02)*	   26.19	  (5.02)*	  
Estimation	  Error	  self	  risk	   20.37	  (4.79)	   18.90	  (2.63)	   18.32	  (4.54)*	   21.43	  (4.23)*	  
Estimation	  Error	  base	  rates	   20.47	  (3.83)*	   15.43	  (2.00)*	   18.87	  (3.79)*	   16.68	  (2.63)*	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Table 5.1: Participants’ ratings of familiarity, prior experience, negativity, memory errors, 
initial estimates, number of trials and estimation errors. *significant difference between 
desirable and undesirable variable (p<0.05) within same classification. 
 
Estimation Errors: As the magnitude of the update is likely to be related to the magnitude 
of the initial estimation error (i.e. the difference between the participant estimate and the 
information provided) it is critical to examine for differences in the magnitude of the 
errors for good and bad news trials. 
Under classification two there was a difference between good news and bad news 
estimation errors for self risk (t(31) = -2.52, P<0.02). Under both classifications there 
were differences between good and bad news estimation errors for base rates 
(classification one: t(31) = 6.40, P < 0.01; classification two: t(31) = 2.40 p<0.03). These 
differences were controlled for in the results reported in sections 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.2.2 by 
calculating for each participant the difference in mean absolute estimation errors for good 
and bad news trials. These difference scores were then added as a covariate in a repeated 
measures ANOVA with valence (good/bad news) as a repeated factor and mean update 
scores as the dependent variable.   
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Figure 5.3: Update for self risk and base rates under different classifications of desirability. 
Participants update estimates of their self risk more when the information they received was 
good news compared to bad news. Participants update estimates of their base rates more 
when the information they received was good news compared to bad news under 
classification one but not under classification two after controlling for relevant covariates. 
Update calculated as first minus second estimation for good news trials and the reverse for 
bad news trials (positive values therefore indicate a move towards the information 
presented). Error bars are SEM; *indicates statistical significance at a threshold of P < 0.05, 
two tailed after controlling for all relevant covariates. Trials classified as good news when 
the participant overestimated the probability of the event occurring and bad news when the 
participant underestimated the probability of the event occurring: (a) to themselves relative 
to the provided base rate; (b) in the population relative to the provided base rate.  
 
5.3.3 Do estimation errors underlie desirability and update? 
 
5.3.3.1 Updating and estimation errors 
Formal models suggest that learning from information that disconfirms one’s expectations 
is mediated by a prediction error signal that quantifies a difference between expectation 
and outcome (Schultz et al,, 1997; Schultz, 1998; Sutton and Barto, 1998). Previously it 
has been shown that an analogous mechanism underpins belief updating in this task 
(Sharot et al., 2011). Specifically, the difference between participants’ initial estimations 
and the information provided (that is, estimation error) predicts subsequent updates, as 
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would be expected from learning models (Sutton and Barto, 1998). The strength of this 
association is indicative of learning. A previous study (Sharot et al., 2011) has shown that 
such learning is valence-dependent, being greater for information that offers an 
opportunity to adopt a more optimistic outlook than for information that calls for a more 
pessimistic outlook. 
Here, I examine if updating for beliefs regarding the self and base rates are better 
predicted by estimation errors derived from beliefs regarding the self and base rates, and 
how this interacts with valence. To this end I conducted linear regressions for each 
participant with both Estimation Errors of Self Risk (unsigned) and Estimation Errors of 
Base Rate (unsigned) predicting: (1) Good News Update of self risk, (2) Bad News 
Update of self risk, (3) Good News Update of base rate, (4) Bad News Update of base 
rate, under both classifications. Regression coefficients were then tested at the group level.  
As seen in Figure 5.4, estimation errors for self risk were better at predicting 
update for self risk and estimation errors for base rates were better at predicting update for 
base rates. In addition, the strength of the association between self-estimation errors and 
self-updating was valence dependent under classification one (t(31) = 4.60, p<0.01), 
replicating previous findings (Sharot et al., 2011). Under classification 2 base rate 
estimation errors gain more predictive power in explaining some of the variance 
previously explained by self estimation errors.  This resulted in neither type of estimation 
error alone showing a valence dependent difference in predicting self update. Rather, there 
was a main effect of valence such that estimation errors (of base rates and self together) 
were more predictive of update in response to good news than bad news information 
(F(31) = 4.78, p<0.05). 
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Figure 5.4: Regression coefficients predicting update from estimation errors. Estimation 
Error of self risk (i.e. the difference between a participants’ estimate of self risk and 
provided base rate) significantly predicted update of self risk both for trials in which 
subjects received good and bad news, and under both classifications. Estimation Error of 
base rate (i.e. the difference between a participants’ estimate of base rate and provided base 
rate) significantly predicted update of base rate both for trials in which participants received 
good and bad news, and under both classifications. Error bars are SEM; * indicates 
statistical significance at a threshold of P<0.05, two tailed paired sample t- test after 
controlling for relevant factors; ** indicates significantly different to a mean of 0, one 
sample t-test (P < 0.05).  
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5.3.3.2 Desirability and estimation errors 
Participants rated how desirable information was. I investigated whether subjective 
desirability ratings were driven by the extent to which the statistical information differed 
from participants’ estimates self risk, estimates of base rates, or both.  
For each participant each set of estimation errors was correlated with their 
desirability ratings across trials. There was a positive correlation between desirability 
ratings and estimation errors for self risk (mean r = 0.50, significantly different from zero 
across the population p < 0.01) and estimation errors for base rate (mean r = 0.55, 
significantly different from zero across the population p < 0.01). Specifically, participants 
rated information as increasingly desirable as the information provided diverged from 
their own estimate such that the former was a lower number. Steigers Z did not reveal a 
significant difference between the two sets of correlations (Z = -0.5, p>0.60), suggesting 
that desirability is associated with both sets of estimation errors to a similar extent. 
5.3.3.3 Effects of question order and frame  
To examine whether the question order (i.e. if subject estimated their own likelihood first 
and then base rate or vice versa) and frame (i.e. if they were required to estimate 
likelihood of the event happening or not happening) influenced updating, a 3 way repeated 
measure ANOVA on updating scores was conducted with question order (self 
estimate/base rate first), frame (happen/ not happen) and valence (good/bad) entered as 
repeated factors under each classification. Two effects were revealed. 
First, there was an interaction between valence and order for updating self risk under 
classification two (F(31)=7.14, p<0.02, Figure 5.5b) and a trend under classification one 
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(F(31)=4.03, p=0.05, Figure 5.5a) was observed. The interaction was characterized by 
greater valence-dependent updating when subjects estimated their own vulnerability 
before estimating base rate. This interesting result suggests that biased updating is reduced 
yet still significant when we first consider population base rates and only then our own 
likelihood (classification one; F(31)=20.67, p<0.01; classification two; F(31)=6.39, 
p<0.05). This may be because initial self-estimates tend to be more accurate when 
reported after estimates of base rates (t(31) = 1.74, p = 0.09) and/or because undesirable 
information of base rates may be more difficult to ignore under such ordering.  
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Figure 5.5: Examining order and frame effects for updates of self risk revealed (a) a trend 
for a valence by order interaction under classification one (F(31)=4.03, p=0.05). (b) This 
interaction was significant under classification two (F(31)=7.14, p<0.02). In both instances, 
the interaction was characterized by greater valence-dependent updating when subjects 
estimated their own vulnerability before estimating base rate. 
 
 Second, a main effect of frame for updating of base rates was found under 
classification one (F(31)=5.40, p<0.05, Figure 5.6) with updating for “happening” being 
greater than updating for “not happening”. However, the effect was not significant under 
classification two, nor for self risk under either classification 
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Figure 5.6: Examining order and frame effects for updates of base rates revealed a main 
effect of frame for updating under classification one (F(31)=5.40, p<0.05). 
5.4 Discussion 
These results give further evidence that individuals selectively update their beliefs when 
estimating their own risk; updating their estimates to a greater extent and more akin to a 
Bayesian agent in response to information that offers an opportunity to adjust predictions 
in an optimistic direction relative to information that can reduce optimism. Importantly, 
these results further show that valence-dependent updating of self risk reported previously 
(Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett et al., 2014; Moutsiana et al., 2013, 2015; Sharot et al., 
2011, 2012a, 2012b) is not contingent on the specific method by which trials are divided 
into “good news” and “bad news”.  
In the original task (Sharot et al., 2011) participants estimate their own probability 
of encountering negative events and then receive information regarding the population 
base rates. Trials are then labelled “good news” if the base rates provided are better than 
the participants’ estimate of self risk and “bad news” if the base rates provided are worse 
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than the participants’ estimate of self risk. Such a division has proved useful when 
examining how the brain codes for the difference between ones’ estimate of self risk and 
information regarding base rates. Specifically, it has been found in the past that the left 
inferior frontal gyrus, medial frontal lobe and cerebellum track the magnitude of the 
difference between a person’s estimate of self risk and information regarding base rates 
when that information is better than the person’s estimate of their own vulnerability, while 
the right inferior frontal gyrus codes for the magnitude of such errors when the 
information is worse (Sharot et al., 2011).  
One can imagine a scenario where an individual holds a different estimate of their 
self risk and of the base rate and receives information regarding the base rate that is worse 
than their estimate of their self risk but better than their estimated base rate. Under this 
scenario whether the information is good news or not may be ambiguous. In this study by 
asking participants to label the information themselves as good or bad and dividing the 
trials in two different ways (according to the participants’ estimates of their self risk and 
according to the participants’ estimates of base rates) I show that the update bias exists 
under both methods of division.  
It has been suggested that when estimating vulnerability (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1973) a person may take into account both population base rates and diagnostic 
information to reach a prediction regarding personal risk. Thus, information regarding 
base rates will result in adjusting both estimates of personal risks and estimated base rates. 
Selective updating of either may lead to biased estimates for self risk. Here, I show that 
updating of beliefs regarding population base rates is not as robust and clear-cut as 
updating for self risk. Specifically, biased updating for base rates could partially be 
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explained by priors; subjects tended to overestimate base rates such that there were more 
trials in which they ended up receiving desirable information. When accounting for this 
difference the bias for updating base rates did not survive under classification 2. 
Ample evidence suggests that people’s perception of their vulnerability is biased in 
a positive direction (Weinstein and Klein, 1995). This study supports these past findings 
and demonstrates the robustness of the effect as it is observed under different empirical 
definitions of desirability of information provided.  
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Chapter 6 
Optimistic Update for Positive Life Events? 
An Unbiased Test 
 
6.1 Introduction 
When it comes to estimating future events (rather than evaluating abilities and 
characteristics) most (e.g. Baker and Emery, 1993; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 2016; Sharot 
et al., 2011) but not all (Weinstein, 1980; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015), studies have 
examined predictions specifically regarding aversive events (such as illness and violent 
acts). In the literature at present (to my knowledge) there has been only one previous peer 
reviewed study that examined updating of beliefs regarding a future positive life event 
(Wiswall and Zafar, 2015). That study revealed that people update beliefs to a greater 
extent in response to evidence suggesting they are likely to earn more than they thought, 
relative to evidence suggesting they are likely to earn less. While that study suggests that 
optimistic updating of beliefs is indeed observed for positive life events, it is unknown 
whether biased updating for positive life events is greater, smaller, or equal than for 
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negative life events. As unrealistic optimism consists both of overestimating the likelihood 
of positive events and underestimating the likelihood of negative events (Sharot, 2011; 
Weinstein, 1980), the question of whether the same mechanism underlies both types of 
events equally is important for understanding optimism.  
6.1.1 Obtaining statistics for positive events. 
In the original belief updating task (Sharot et al., 2011), participants are asked to estimate 
their likelihood of experiencing 80 aversive events in their lifetime (first estimates). They 
are then presented with the likelihood of these events in their population (information) 
and subsequently asked to estimate their likelihoods again (second estimate). Trials are 
then divided into ones where participants received good news (they learn that an aversive 
event is less likely than they thought) and trials where participants received bad news 
(they learn an aversive event is more likely than they thought). Update is calculated as the 
difference between the first and second estimate. When attempting to adapt this task to 
study positive life events researchers face a number of potential confounds which, if 
ignored, will lead to invalid conclusions. A number of these including the importance of 
controlling for estimation errors are discussed in Chapter 2, however one remains. 
Specifically, whilst validated statistics regarding the likelihood of encountering 
negative events in one’s life-time are well documented (such as the likelihood of suffering 
different type of illness or being a victim of crime, see Chapter 2 for full list of negative 
life events used in the UBT), statistics about the occurrence of positive life events are not 
readily available. This is problematic, as the UBT requires the use of many trials and 
stimuli. Yet, it is practically impossible to find even 40 positive life events accompanied 
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by validated statistics. One may be tempted to make up statistics for positive events to use 
in a study. However, the invalidity of such made up statistics will quickly become 
apparent to the subject, introducing a serious confound, which will make the exercise 
useless.  
Here, to generate meaningful stimuli for both positive and negative life events I 
altered the UBT as follows: I asked participants to estimate their likelihood of 
encountering everyday life events in the upcoming month. I obtained the frequencies of 
such events by asking over 200 participants to report whether different common positive 
and negative life events occurred to them at least once in the past month. I then used this 
data to construct a list of base rates for each event (i.e. the likelihood of each life event 
occurring at least once in a given month in the sample). I then run the UBT on an 
alternate, but demographically well-matched, set of participants, asking them to estimate 
their likelihood of encountering these events in the next month. 
6.2 Materials and Methods 
6.2.1 Construction of stimuli 
6.2.1.1 Participants 
300 participants located in the United States completed the survey on Mechanical Turk. 
As in past studies of the UBT (Garrett and Sharot, 2014; Moutsiana et al., 2013, 2015), I 
excluded participants with a high Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) score indicating 
potential depression. 73 participants were excluded for having a BDI score greater than 11 
(final sample = 227). Participants were all between 20 and 30 years of age (inclusive). 
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Completion of the survey took approximately 25 minutes and participants were 
compensated $3.5 for their time.   
6.2.1.2 Task  
The survey began by collecting basic demographic information from participants (age, 
level of education, marital status, employment status, monthly income). Two training 
trials were then presented to familiarize participants with the task. Participants were then 
presented with 100 different commonly occurring life events for 3 seconds each. These 
were a mixture of positive events (for instance: “Discovered a new song you like”, 
“”Laughed at a joke”) and negative events (for instance: “Had an argument with a family 
member”). Whilst the event was displayed on screen, participants were instructed to recall 
whether this event had happened to them in the past 4 weeks. They were then asked to 
indicate either (1) Yes: This event occurred to me at least once in the past 4 weeks; or (2) 
No: This event did not occur to me in the past 4 weeks. The order of these two options 
was counterbalanced. Participants had unlimited time to make a response (Figure 6.1).  
Laughed at a joke Laughed at a joke 
Occurred? 
No: This event did not occur to 
me in the past 4 weeks 
Yes: This event occurred to me 
at least once in the past 4 weeks 
3s 
self paced 
 
Figure 6.1: Construction of stimuli. Participants were presented with 100 commonly 
occurring positive and negative life events and were instructed to recall whether this event 
had happened to them in the past 4 weeks. Data was then used to construct a list of base 
rates. 
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After completing the survey, participants rated each event on a 5 point likert scale 
(1=Very Negative; 2=Negative; 3=Neutral; 4=Positive; 5=Very Positive) and then 
completed the BDI (Beck et al., 1961) and LOTR (Scheier et al., 1994). The survey was 
constructed and presented using web based survey service Qualtrics.  
6.2.1.3 Analysis and event selection 
For each event, the percentage of participants who indicated the event had occurred to 
them in the past month (out of all participants who completed the study) was calculated. A 
subset of the events (n=54) were selected for use as stimuli. Events were selected such that 
the range of each type of event (positive and negative) was normally distributed around a 
mean of 50% (standard deviations: positive events = 0.17, negative events = 0.21).  
6.2.2 Update Bias Task 
6.2.2.1 Participants 
200 participants located in the United States (age range 20 and 30) completed the survey 
on Mechanical Turk. 56 participants were subsequently excluded for having a BDI score 
above 11 indicating possible depression. A further 2 participants were excluded because 
the range of their responses were limited, resulting in zero trials in either the “good news” 
bin or “bad news” bin, making comparison impossible (final n = 142). There were no 
differences in age, education, income, marital status or employment status between this set 
of participants and participants that had completed the base rate survey used to construct 
the base rate statistics (all P > 0.20). Completion of the survey took approximately 1 hour 
and participants were compensated $7 for their time.  
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Task. The survey began with an attention check designed to filter out participants that did 
not read instructions prudently. Then, demographic information was collected (age, level 
of education marital status, employment status, monthly income) and 2 training examples 
were run to familiarize participants with the task. 
In the first session, on each trial participants were presented with 1 of 54 life 
events (see Table 6.1 for list of events) and asked to imagine the event happening to them 
in the month ahead. They were then asked to estimate how likely that event was to happen 
to them in the next 4 weeks. Participants were instructed to type in an estimate between 
5% and 95%. Trials with responses outside this range were excluded from analysis. 
Participants were then shown the base rate statistic of the event happening in the next 4 
weeks, which ranged from 15% to 85% (see Figure 6.2). They were told that the statistic 
was the average likelihood of this event happening at least once in the next four weeks to 
someone from the same socioeconomic environment as them. In a second session, 
participants were asked to re-estimate how likely each event was to happen to them in the 
next 4 weeks.  
Yelled at by a  
stranger 
Estimation of happening in 
the next 4 weeks? 
4s 
up to 8s 
Yelled at by a  
stranger 
+ 
Actual statistics of happening 
in the next 4 weeks: 
3s 
Yelled at by a  
stranger 
11% 
1s 
Figure 6.2: Update Bias Task. On each trial, participants were presented with a short 
description of one of 54 events and asked to estimate how likely this event was to occur to 
them. They were then presented with the average probability of that event occurring to a 
person like themselves (calculated from the previous task). In a second, session, participants 
were asked to re-estimate how likely the event was to occur to themselves. For each event 
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an update term was calculated as the difference between the participant’s first and second 
estimations, such that positive numbers indicate a move toward the base rate. 
 
Life Event Base	  Rate	  %	  
Mean	  
Desirability	  
Rating	  
Attend a party 45% 4.12 
Cook dinner for friends 36% 4.06 
Donate money to a needy person or cause 37% 4.26 
50 hours or more sleep in a single week 56% 3.65 
Exercise at least twice in a week  70% 4.19 
Finish reading a book  41% 3.95 
Fix a broken possession 39% 3.96 
Find or receive a gift of a dollar or more 56% 4.21 
Get a haircut 45% 3.56 
Get invited to a party  58% 4.00 
Get taken out for dinner 61% 4.19 
Have a sexual encounter that you enjoy 69% 4.59 
Have a supervisor or teacher praise your work 54% 4.28 
Have an out of town friend visit you 30% 4.15 
Have your photo taken 75% 3.32 
Invite a non-family member to a meal 49% 3.89 
Learn a new skill related to work or school 48% 4.19 
Make a purchase in excess of $50 for your personal 
enjoyment 65% 3.90 
Meet with your supervisor 56% 3.19 
Participate in a game of sport 29% 3.71 
Play a board game 29% 3.80 
Play with a pet 75% 4.26 
Run into an old friend that you haven’t seen in a long 
time 30% 4.19 
Receive a pay check 81% 4.48 
Receive a complement about how you dress  54% 4.26 
Shop for clothes 56% 3.69 
Successfully teach someone a new skill or concept 50% 4.11 
Take a day or more of annual leave 19% 3.48 
Try out a new food or dish 74% 4.00 
Try out a new hobby, craft, or sport 31% 4.01 
Go out of town for leisure 36% 4.21 
Wish a friend a happy birthday 67% 4.08 
Win a competitive game of sport 22% 4.03 
Burn something that you are cooking 41% 2.01 
Embarrass yourself 60% 1.84 
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Family or friend get ill 56% 1.63 
Find out that someone you know personally has died 15% 1.30 
Get lost 26% 1.93 
Get rejected by someone 17% 1.65 
Get sick or suffered a physical illness 41% 1.62 
Have a disagreement with a friend 43% 2.06 
Have a headache 82% 1.99 
Hear about a natural disaster 85% 1.84 
Hear of a terrorist attack 35% 1.73 
Hurt someone's feelings 52% 1.85 
Ill one day because of overdrinking 21% 1.83 
Received a phone call from a telemarketer 52% 2.07 
Saw a dead animal/human 56% 1.67 
Stay up past 2 AM for school or work 40% 2.44 
Stuck in traffic 71% 2.00 
Teased at/made fun of 35% 1.92 
Get lied to 60% 1.67 
Receive a utility bill 78% 2.51 
Clean the bathroom 78% 3.12 
Table 6.1: List of the stimuli used in the study, their respective base rates and mean 
desirability rating. Base rates were generated from an independent set of participants tasked 
with reporting whether each event had happened to them at least once in the previous 
month. Life events were classified as positive or negative separately for each participant 
according to their own rating. Hence some events may be classified as positive for some 
participants but negative for others. There was, however, a high level of agreement among 
participants (interclass correlation coefficient = 0.75). Life events rated as neutral (i.e. 
neither positive nor negative) were not included in the analysis. On average 27 events were 
categorized as positive, 18 as negative and 7 as neutral.  
 
After completion of the task, I tested participants’ memory for the information 
presented. Participants were asked to recall the information previously presented of each 
event. Subsequently, participants were then asked to rate all life events according to how 
positive or negative they found them on a likert scale (1=very negative, 2=negative, 
3=neutral, 4=positive, 5=very positive). See Table 6.1 for mean ratings of desirability 
across participants used to compile base rates for each event. They were also asked to rate 
past experience with each event (“Has this event happened to you before?” From 1 = 
never to 6 = very often). 
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Three quarters of participants (75%) also rated all events on: vividness (“How 
vividly could you imagine this event?” From 1 = not vivid to 6 = very vivid); familiarity 
(“Regardless if this event has happened to you before, how familiar do you feel it is to you 
from TV, friends, movies and so on?” From 1 = not at all familiar to 6 very familiar); and 
arousal (“When you imagine this event happening to you how emotionally arousing is the 
image in your mind?” From 1 = not arousing at all to 6 = very arousing). The scores of 
these are reported in Table 6.2 Participants then completed the BDI and the LOTR. The 
survey was constructed and presented using web based survey service Qualtrics. 
 Positive Life Events, mean 
(SD) 
Negative Life Events, mean 
(SD) 
Ratings Good news Bad news Good news Bad news 
Subjective Scales 
Questionnaire:  
1 = low to 6 = high     
FamiliarityL, V*L 4.68 (0.77) 5.11 (0.70) 4.75 (0.84) 4.35 (0.99) 
VividnessL, V*L 4.42 (0.82) 4.83 (0.65) 4.34 (0.84) 3.97 (0.99) 
Emotional arousalV, L, V*L 3.75 (0.91) 3.92 (1.00) 3.89 (0.83) 3.10 (1.27) 
Prior experienceV, L, V*L  3.80 (0.81) 4.51 (0.68) 3.75 (0.84) 3.18 (0.91) 
Table 6.2: Additional ratings provided by 75% of the participants. Prior Experience rated 
by all participants. A 2*2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for each subjective 
rating with life event type (positive/negative life event) and valence (desirable/undesirable) 
as factors. L Main effect life event valence (positive/negative) p < 0.05; V Main effect 
information valence (good news/bad news), p < 0.05; V*L Interaction (valence by life event), 
p < 0.05 
 
6.2.2.2 Analysis 
Life events were categorized as negative or positive for each participant individually 
according to their own evaluation. Specifically, events were classified as positive if the 
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participant rated the event as 4 (positive) or 5 (very positive) in the ratings section of the 
task, and negative if rated as a 1 (very negative) or 2 (negative). Events with a neutral 
rating of 3 were excluded from the analysis.  
For each type of event, participants could receive either “good news” or “bad 
news” depending on whether the participant initially overestimated or underestimated the 
probability of the event relative to the base rate (see Table 6.3). Specifically, if their first 
estimate was lower than the base rate presented, the information would be categorized as 
“good news” if the life event was positive and “bad news” if the life event was negative 
(column 1, Table 6.3). If their first estimate was higher than the base rate presented, the 
information would be categorized as “bad news” if the event was rated as a positive life 
event and “good news” if the event was rated as a negative life event (column 2, Table 
6.3). Trials in which the initial estimate was equal to the statistic presented were excluded 
from subsequent analyses as these could not be categorized into either condition (less than 
one negative life event trial and less than one positive life event trial on average per 
participant). 
 Initial Estimate < Base Rate Initial Estimate > Base Rate 
Positive Life Event 
(e.g. Get invited to a party) 
   
Good News 
  
Bad News 
Negative Life Event 
(e.g. Have a headache) 
   
Bad News 
  
Good News 
Table 6.3: Categorization of events 
 
 
Belief update was calculated for each trial and participant as the difference 
between first and second estimate. As done previously (Garrett et al., 2014; Moutsiana et 
al., 2013; Moutsiana, et al., 2015; Sharot, Kanai, et al., 2012) update was calculated such 
that positive scores indicate a move towards the base rate, regardless of event type and 
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valence categorization, and negative scores a move away from the base rate. Mean update 
scores for each participant were entered into a 2 (good/bad news) by 2 (positive/negative 
life event) repeated measures ANOVA. Controlling for (1) the difference in memory for 
good news trials and bad news trials, both for positive and negative stimuli, (2) the 
difference in number of good news trials and bad news trials, both for positive and 
negative stimuli (3) the difference in absolute estimation errors for good news trials and 
bad news trials, both for positive and negative stimuli (estimation error = | first estimate – 
base rate |). These were controlled for by entering the difference scores (6 in total) as 
covariates.   
6.3 Results 
There was an asymmetry in updating such that participants updated more in response to 
good news than bad news. This bias was not significantly different for positive and 
negative events. Specifically, entering update scores into a 2*2 repeated measures 
ANOVA with desirability of information (good/bad news) and life event type 
(positive/negative life event) as factors (controlling for differences in memory, differences 
in number of trials and differences in estimation errors) revealed a main effect of 
desirability of information (F(1,135)=6.29, p<0.02), no effect of event type 
(F(1,135)=0.08, p=0.78) and no interaction (F(1,135)=0.31, p=0.58). The main effect of 
desirability was characterized by greater updating in response to good news compared to 
bad news for both positive life events (mean good news update=8.71, mean bad news 
update=7.79) and negative life events (mean good news update=10.66, mean bad news 
update=6.62). Figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3: Biased Updating. Updating is greater for good news compared to bad news 
(main effect of desirability of information: F(1,135)=6.29, p<0.02). Error bars represent 
SEM.  
6.4 Discussion 
In this study, because valid base rates regarding the likelihood of positive events occurring 
during a person’s lifetime are difficult to come by, I altered the UBT. Specifically, I 
elicited real statistics for both positive and negative life events by sampling a large group 
of participants prior to conducting the study, asking them to indicate which of 100 
different events did and did not happen to them in the last four weeks. This provided a set 
of base rates, a subset of which were used to test a second group of participants, matched 
to the first, on the UBT. The second set of participants were also asked to estimate the 
likelihood of events happening in the next four weeks, rather than in a lifetime.  
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The current results show a valence dependent asymmetry in how participants 
update their beliefs, consistent with other findings (Eil and Rao, 2011; Korn et al., 2012; 
Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 2016; Lefebvre et al., 2016; Mobius et al., 2012; Sharot, 2011; 
Sharot and Garrett, 2016; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012b). Here, I observe this asymmetry 
when people update their beliefs regarding their likelihood of experiencing every day 
events in an upcoming month. In particular, participants updated their beliefs to a greater 
extent when receiving good news regarding the likelihood of experiencing future life 
events in the next four weeks relative to bad news. Such an asymmetry in belief updating 
has been suggested as a mechanism supporting optimism (Sharot and Garrett, 2016).  
Whilst unrealistic optimism has been previously reported for both positive (e.g. 
winning an award) and negative (e.g. divorce) life events (Weinstein, 1980), the extent of 
asymmetric updating for positive and negative life events has never been compared. The 
aim of this study was to compare optimistic updating (i.e. updating more when receiving 
desirable compared to undesirable information) for future positive life events with that for 
future negative life events. These results show no statistical differences in the pattern of 
updating for positive and negative life events - in both cases participants (n= 142) updated 
their beliefs to a greater extent when receiving desirable information compared to 
undesirable information, regardless of whether the information was regarding a positive 
life event (such as: “Receive a complement about how you dress”) or a negative life event 
(such as: “Hurt someone’s feelings”).  
In sum, this study (1) extends the finding of an asymmetry in belief updating to 
everyday life events and (2) reveals a similar pattern of asymmetric updating for positive 
and negative life events.  
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Chapter 7 
General Discussion 
 
The studies that comprise this thesis (Chapters 3-6) comprise two sections. The first 
section - Chapters 3 and 4 – set out to explore individual variation in biased information 
integration, investigating first how it is altered in patients with clinical depression 
(Chapter 3) and when individuals encounter a threatening environment (Chapter 4). The 
second section - Chapters 5 and 6 - set out to test the robustness of biased information 
integration. Specifically, these studies examine whether biased information integration 
exists under different definitions of good and bad news (Chapter 5) and whether biased 
information integration occurs for positive as well as negative life events (Chapter 6). 
This discussion will provide a brief summary of the aims, findings and limitations 
of each chapter. Finally it will provide some suggestions for future research.  
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7.1 Summary and limitations of experimental investigations 
7.1.1 Chapter 3: Neural Substrates of Unbiased Belief Updating in 
Depression 
7.1.1.1 Summary 
In this study, I investigate whether biased information integration is altered in 
patients with MDD. I use fMRI in conjunction with the UBT administered to clinically 
depressed patients and healthy controls to characterize brain activity that supports belief 
updating and differences in belief updating between clinically depressed patients and 
healthy controls. The behavioural results reveal an interaction between valence (whether a 
piece of news is good or bad) and group (MDD versus Control) for updating. This is 
characterized by greater updating in response to bad news by the MDD group relative to 
the control group. As a result, the MDD group do not show the bias in updating observed 
in the control group.  
The fMRI results in this study suggest that unbiased belief updating in depression 
is mediated by strong neural coding of estimation errors in response to both good news (in 
left inferior frontal gyrus and bilateral superior frontal gyrus) and bad news (in right 
inferior parietal lobule and right inferior frontal gyrus) regarding the future. In contrast, 
intact mental health was linked to a relatively attenuated neural coding of bad news about 
the future. These findings identify a potential neural substrate which mediates the 
breakdown of biased updating in Major Depression Disorder, which may be important for 
mental health.  
7.1.1.2 Limitations 
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One limitation of the study reported is that the depressed patients recruited were 
moderately rather than severely depressed. Another study that also used the UBT to 
examine differences between MDD and healthy controls (Korn et al., 2013) used a severer 
sample of depressed patients (mean BDI of 32.6 compared to 25.8 in the patient group 
used in Chapter 3). This study also found that MDD patients were unbiased in their 
updating. However, this was the result of reduced updating of good news rather than 
enhanced updating of bad news as I report here.  
Another limitation is that as a result of a using a between subject design it was not 
possible to directly show that asymmetric updating varies with depression within an 
individual. A within subject design testing MDD patients both in and out of a depressive 
episode at different time points would be needed to test this.  
7.1.2 Chapter 4: Updating Beliefs Under Threat 
7.1.2.1 Summary 
In this study I investigate if an asymmetry in information integration is altered in response 
to stress. I provide evidence that biased information integration is state dependent and 
evaporates under stress. This pattern of results was observed in a controlled laboratory 
setting (Experiment I) and in firefighters on duty (Experiment II). Such flexibility in how 
individuals integrate information may enhance the likelihood of responding to warnings 
with caution in threatening environments, whilst maintaining a positivity bias otherwise, a 
strategy that may increase well-being.  
7.1.2.2 Limitations 
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A limitation to this study is that in Experiment II, whilst it was possible to obtain self 
report measures of stress from participants (firefighters), it was not possible to get 
physiological measures (SCR, cortisol) as it was for Experiment I, owing to participants 
conducting the study online and whilst on call, rather than in the laboratory. Another 
drawback with Experiment II is that it was not possible to tie self report measures of stress 
to a specific external event. Whilst likely that some stress reported is due to the nature of 
the job, it is unknown whether a particular aspect of the job is the stressor (such as how 
many call outs, how stressful the last call out was) and/or whether factors unrelated to the 
job are also contributing.  
A limitation of both Experiments I and II is that as a result of a using a between 
subject design it was not possible to directly show that asymmetric updating varies with 
stress within an individual. A within subject design testing participants twice, once when 
under stress and once when not under stress would be required to test this.  
7.1.3 Chapter 5: How Robust is the Optimistic Update Bias for 
Estimating Self-risk and Population Base Rates? 
7.1.3.1 Summary 
The aim of the study reported in Chapter 5 was to examine the robustness of the update 
bias by examining whether it exists when a different classification scheme is used to 
classify events as good and bad news. I ran a version of the UBT in which participants 
were asked to provide estimates of the base rate of each event as well as estimate their 
own likelihood. Events were categorised as good news or bad news in two different ways: 
(1) According to whether estimate for own likelihood was above or below the base rate 
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presented, as done in previous studies using the UBT (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Korn et al., 
2013; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 2016; Moutsiana et al., 2013, 2015; Sharot et al., 2011, 
2012a, 2012b); (2) According to whether estimate for the base rate was above or below 
the base rate presented (also see Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 2016).   
Participants update beliefs regarding risk in the population in an asymmetric 
manner regardless of the different empirical definitions of desirable information (i.e. 
under both classifications, biased updating is present). In contrast, valence-dependent 
updating of base rates were accounted for by priors. The presence of a bias in updating for 
the self and absence of a bias in updating for base rates is consistent with a separate study, 
conducted by a different research group using a different version of the UBT 
(Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 2016).  
I analysed the degree to which participants updating patterns correspond to that of 
a Bayesian agent. I did this separately for receipt of good news and bad news, again under 
both classifications of good/bad news. The results from this analysis revealed that there 
was a tighter correspondence between updating by a Bayesian agent and by human 
participants when in receipt of good news compared to when in receipt of bad news. This 
was the case under both classification schemes. This is consistent with other studies that 
have examined updating beliefs about personality traits such as attractiveness (Eil and 
Rao, 2011) and intelligence (Eil and Rao, 2011; Mobius et al., 2012) using a Bayesian 
approach.  
This study expands our knowledge of information integration and how it is guided 
by valence. It shows that individuals update information about their own likelihoods to a 
greater extent, and in a more Bayesian manner, when receiving good news compared to 
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bad news. This is not something selective to a specific method of classifying good and bad 
news. 
7.1.3.2 Limitations 
A limitation of this study is that the design does not capture a full distribution of 
participants priors. This is also the case in other studies reported in this thesis. However, it 
is a particular limitation of this study since it prevents a full characterisation of how a 
Bayesian agent would update given the distribution of priors. If a full prior distribution 
was elicited from participants (for example, by having them provide repeat estimates, 
draw out a probability distribution or provide confidence intervals), as done in another 
study (Eil and Rao, 2011), this would enable a more accurate prediction of how a 
Bayesian agent should update following presentation of each base rate, particularly in 
instances where prior beliefs are skewed.   
7.1.4 Chapter 6: Optimistic Update for Positive Life Events? An 
Unbiased Test 
7.1.4.1 Summary 
The majority of studies that have examined belief updating about the likelihood of 
negative life events occurring in the future have used negative aversive life events 
exclusively (Chowdhury et al., 2014; Garrett and Sharot, 2014; Korn et al., 2013; 
Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 2016; Moutsiana et al., 2013, 2015; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a). 
In the study reported in Chapter 6, I examined belief updating for positive and negative 
life events. Owing to an absence of statistically meaningful statistics for positive life 
events that match the negative life events that are typically used, I examined this using a 
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new approach. Specifically, I ran on online version of the UBT using everyday life events 
as stimuli. To get meaningful base rates for these events I asked a large group of online 
participants to report whether each life event had occurred to them at least once in the 
previous month. This data set was used to calculate the average likelihood of each event 
occurring in this group in a month. The UBT was then run on a separate group of 
participants (well matched to the first group for demographics) who were asked to 
estimate the likelihood of each event to occur in the following month, presented with base 
rates ascertained from the first group and subsequently asked to re-estimate their own 
likelihood of each event to occur the following month. 
The results from this study revealed that an overall update bias exists when both 
positive and negative life events are used (main effect of valence, no main effect of life 
event or interaction between valence and life event). As well as extending the remit of 
biased updating to positive and negative life events, this study also expands previous 
findings in other ways. It shows that biased updating occurs for everyday life events and 
that it exists in a new different demographic sample - MTurk workers living in the US – 
which has not been tested before (Garrett and Sharot, 2014; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 
2016; Sharot et al., 2011, 2012a; Moutsiana et al., 2013). 
7.1.4.1 Limitations 
A limitation is that whilst participants rated how positive/negative they considered each 
event, they were not asked to rate how important or significant each event would be to 
them if it occurred and this might be just as important a factor as valence. This is 
discussed in greater detail in the next section.      
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7.2 Key questions for future research 
7.2.1 The interplay between anxiety, biased updating and depression 
The results reported in Chapter 3 revealed an association between depression 
symptomology and the degree of positive bias in information integration. Separate to this, 
Chapter 4 revealed an association between anxiety and the degree of positive bias in 
information integration. Characterising the way in which anxiety, depression and biased 
belief updating relate to and impact one another (along with their co-morbidity) are key 
questions for future research. 
A recent cognitive neuropsychological model of depression (Clark et al., 2009; 
Roiser et al., 2011) provides a framework for understanding the factors that lead to 
alterations in information processing and at what stages these factors could fit into both 
the onset and development of depression. Simplified, the model proposes that genetic 
factors and stressful life events cause alterations in monoamine transmission which disrupt 
the functioning of low level brain circuits. These result in negative affective processing 
biases (biasing individuals towards negative stimuli and/or away from positive stimuli) in 
a range of domains such as emotional perception (Gilboa-Schectman et al., 2002) and 
emotional memory recall (Bradley et al., 1995). Importantly, these negative affective 
processing biases play a causal role in the initial development of depression rather than 
being a symptom of it. Over time, these negative affective processing biases cause 
negative schemata’s to develop (Beck, 1967) which, once established, can lead to the 
development of subsequent top down negative affective processing biases such as deficits 
in affective cognitive control (Clark et al., 2009) which can exacerbate the state of 
depression and/or contribute to its persistence.  
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One hypothesis about the directionality of the different factors, consistent with 
both the cognitive neuropsychological model of depression (Roiser et al., 2011) and 
current findings in relation to the UBT, is that stress and/or genetic factors cause 
individuals to be more sensitive to negative information, possibly as a result of changes in 
dopamine function (dopamine has previously been shown to alter belief updating in the 
UBT, see Sharot et al., 2012b). This in turn leads these individuals to form pessimistic 
beliefs (Strunk et al., 2006) which contribute to the onset of depression. Under this 
hypothesis, alterations in belief updating occur in part as the result of stress and occur 
prior to the initial onset of depression. 
An alternative hypothesis is that initial onset of depression occurs as the result of 
alterations to low level information processing biases specifically such as emotional 
attention. It does not occur as the result of changes to information integration in relation to 
beliefs; since these can be construed as more abstract and high level forms of information 
processing, alterations occur at a later point in time. Depression is often comorbid with 
anxiety (Baldwin et al., 2002; Cameron, 2005) and findings in Chapter 4 showed a 
relationship between anxiety and individuals sensitivity to negative information. Under 
this hypothesis, alterations in belief updating also occur after the initial onset of 
depression and either mediates or is mediated by anxiety.  
Both of these hypothesises are consistent with the fact that throughout the life span 
anxiety (Deeming, 2013), depression (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2008) and balanced 
integration of information (Chowdhury et al., 2013; Moutsiana et al., 2013) follow an 
inverse U shape; being low for teenagers and the elderly and high in middle-aged. Note 
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that the two hypothesis are not mutually exclusive and increased sensitivity to negative 
information could be a factor in both the onset of depression and its perseverance. 
Longitudinal designs could be used to help crystallise how information processing, 
depression and anxiety interact with one another. One such study (along the lines of Chan 
et al., 2007) could examine belief updating in individuals who have not been diagnosed 
with depression but are reported to have high levels of anxiety such as individuals with 
high levels of neuroticism. If it can be established that highly neurotic individuals lack a 
positive bias in belief updating and subsequently observed that they develop depression, 
this would lend support to the view that unbiased belief updating can occur pre depression 
onset and may be a cause (rather than just a symptom) of it. An alternate longitudinal 
study could examine individuals who have not been diagnosed with depression and do not 
have a history of anxiety but are at risk of developing depression in their lifetime (e.g., 
individuals with first degree relatives that suffer from depression). If it can be established 
that those individuals that proceed to develop depression exhibit a positive bias in belief 
updating pre depression onset and observed that this bias subsequently reduces, this would 
suggest that alterations in the bias are a symptom of depression once it has formed and set 
in. Note that in this latter scenario, anxiety may still play a key role in altering belief 
updating. One possibility for instance is that once an episode of depression has formed, 
individuals are less able to regulate attention away from aversive stimuli and this can be 
anxiety inducing (which, in line with the results of Chapter 4, could cause individuals to 
be more responsive to bad news in the UBT). Section 7.2.9 discusses in more detail the 
possible relationship between attention, biases in belief updating and depression and how 
this might be tested.  
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Using the UBT longitudinally in this way can therefore help identify the stage or 
stages at which biases in belief updating fit into the causes of depression. This can have 
important implications for treatment in terms of determining whether pharmacological or 
behavioural approaches (such as cognitive behavioural therapy) are most likely to be 
effective (Rosier et al., 2011).  
7.2.2 Neurological mechanism by which stress alters information 
integration 
The physiological measures taken in Chapter 4 do not enable identification as to the 
neurological mechanism by which threat increases integration of bad news. One 
possibility is that the stress response to threat interferes with top down control 
mechanisms that normally inhibit integration of bad news. It has been shown that stress 
impairs frontal lobe function reducing cognitive control and modulation of subcortical 
regions (see review in Yu, 2016). Interfering with left IFG activity, one of the frontal 
regions identified as tracking information in Chapter 3, using TMS has been shown to 
abolish asymmetric information integration in the UBT task by increasing information 
integration from unwanted information (Sharot et al., 2012a) which suggests that 
ordinarily the IFG may inhibit information integration from negative information and that 
interfering with its activity using TMS releases this inhibition. Furthermore, individuals 
with strong white matter connectivity between the left IFG and subcortical regions 
involved in valuation, emotion and learning show greater valence dependant asymmetry in 
information integration and reduced integration from bad news, possibly because of 
increased ability for frontal-subcortical modulation (Moustiana et al., 2015). Taken 
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together, stress may mimic the effects found in individuals following TMS, which 
diminishes activity in cognitive control related regions, releasing the tendency to dismiss 
negative information. A second possibility is that the stress reaction to threat directly 
boosts integration of negative information. For example, it has been shown that negative, 
but not positive, prediction errors in the striatum are amplified under stress (Robinson et 
al., 2013). It may be that the representation of negative, but not positive, estimation errors 
are also amplified under stress. Future studies are needed to reveal the neural mechanism 
by which stress abolishes asymmetric information integration.  
7.2.3 Understanding the process of likelihood ratio formation 
Chapter 5 examined the degree to which updating correspond to that of a Bayesian agent. 
However the analysis reported relies on a number of assumptions. A strong one is that 
participants first estimates of their own likelihood has been calculated accurately through 
a process of Bayesian integration; this needs to be assumed in order to calculate the 
likelihood ratio participants have, implicitly, used to arrive at their estimates. However, it 
is not known empirically whether participants do actually arrive at such estimates through 
Bayesian integration and - if so – how well they implement this calculation. In reality, 
participants may have noisy priors and/or likelihood ratios leading to noisy estimates 
when these are integrated to form posteriors. In addition, participants may have difficulty 
with the process of integration itself which will also lead to noisy estimates. Note that past 
studies in belief updating (and the results in this study) suggest that participants are often 
not perfectly matched by Bayesian agents. Mobius et al. (2012) for instance show that 
participants update conservatively relative to Bayesian agents when expressing beliefs 
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about their intelligence and this is the case both when they receive good and bad news 
(although they are more conservative in the case of bad news).  
Another assumption is that likelihood ratios remain constant between participants’ 
first and second estimates. This permits that the likelihood ratio implied from participants 
first estimates be used to calculate their “Bayesian” 2nd estimate. Likelihood ratios may 
not remain fixed in this way, however. Intuitively, the process of ascertaining evidence 
pertaining to whether an event will happen is a complex one. Taking burglary as an 
example again, an individual is likely to have a multitude of potential pieces of evidence 
they could bring to mind, some of which are more likely to be present if the event happens 
(e.g. live on ground floor, have no security system, etc.) and some of which are more 
likely to be present if the event does not happen (e.g. have vicious guard dog, member of 
neighbourhood watch scheme, etc.). What are the factors that determine which pieces of 
evidence are called to mind and how these are weighed up against each other to determine 
a likelihood ratio? The complexity inherent here makes it possible that likelihood ratios 
vary each time one is asked to make an estimate rather than remain fixed. In addition it is 
also possible that estimates of likelihood ratios may themselves depend in part on valence. 
Consider if one gets bad news. A potential mechanism to prevent full integration of this 
information could be to subsequently recall more instances of, or give greater weight to, 
pieces of evidence that would be present if the event does not happen (and less instances 
of evidence that would be present if the event were to happen). Highly relevant to this idea 
is the theme of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) which proposes that individuals need 
evidence to support a judgement but the quantity of cognitive processing (Kruglanski and 
Ajzen, 1983; Pyszczynski and Greenberg, 1987; Ditto and Lopez, 1992) and the range of 
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cognitive strategies employed (Kunda, 1990) to generate this evidence varies depending 
on the conclusion individuals would prefer to arrive at. In one study (Sanitioso et al., 
1990), participants were asked to generate autobiographical memories of instances in 
which they had behaved in an introverted and extraverted way. Beforehand, participants 
were either led to believe that introversion or that extroversion was a desirable character 
trait. Participants led to believe that introversion was a desirable trait generated a greater 
number of memories for introversion and vice versa for participants led to believe that 
extroversion was a desirable character trait. This suggests that memory search was biased 
towards reaching evidence consistent with possessing a desirable character trait. Similar 
biases in memory search have been found in other studies (Ross et al., 1981; Markus and 
Kunda, 1986).  
Applied to the UBT, a possibility is that part of the mechanism that gives rise to 
asymmetric updating is a biased search for and selection of evidence towards a belief one 
wants to hold. Such a bias will influence the extent to which presented base rates are 
integrated to form new beliefs. Identifying the factors involved in generating likelihood 
ratios and understanding how these factors are influenced by valence is an important area 
for future research and key to building comprehensive picture of belief updating in a 
Bayesian framework.  
7.2.4 The role of motivation in asymmetric updating 
A suggestion outlined in Chapter 1 is that one of the constraints of the bias is that there 
needs to be motivation on the part of the agent to disregard undesirable information. In the 
case of own likelihoods, agents derive positive utility from maintaining a positive picture 
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of their future and negative utility by shifting to worse views of their future (Loewenstein, 
2006; Brunnermeier and Parker, 2004).  
An interesting question that comes out of this is whether biased updating varies as 
the relevance of the information to the participant is manipulated. For example, are 
participants also relatively unbiased in updating when the focus of the update is not 
themselves specifically but someone close to them (e.g. a spouse, close friend, work 
colleague) who they might be motivated to maintain positive views of? One might expect 
to also see a bias in these instances and that as the importance of the individual the 
information concerns to the participant decreases, biased updating also decreases (as 
individuals are only motivated to maintain positive views of themselves and those close to 
them). And how might biased integration of information vary if people actively dislike the 
person under consideration (e.g. their worst enemy)? One possibility is that biased 
updating flips in the other direction such that people update more when they get “bad 
news” about that persons likelihood of encountering a disease and offers reluctance to 
update when receiving good news4.  
The question of motive is also raised by the study presented in Chapter 6. In this 
study, participants are asked to rate how positive or negative they find each life event. 
This is a conceptually different question, however, to ascertaining how much participants 
want each event to happen to them that month. For instance, most people would rate 
“Finding £20” as a positive life event. But the importance of this event happening in the 
month ahead may well vary from person to person (depending on individual income levels 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Here	  the	  terms	  “good	  news”	  and	  “bad	  news”	  become	  somewhat	  ambiguous	  as	  what	  is	  good	  news	  for	  the	   target	   of	   the	   information	   (e.g.	   the	   participants	   nemesis)	   may	   constitute	   bad	   news	   for	   the	  participant	  if	  they	  prefer	  that	  they	  have	  a	  higher	  likelihood	  of	  negative	  life	  events	  happening	  to	  them	  and	  a	   lower	   likelihood	  of	  positive	   life	  events	  happening	  to	  them.	  Here	  I	  refer	   to	  good	  and	  bad	  news	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  target	  of	  the	  information	  (not	  the	  participant).	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for instance). If motivation is important, one would expect the bias to covary with the 
importance of the event to the individual as well as with how positive/negative the event 
is. 	  
7.2.5 Environmental volatility 
Chapter 6 revealed that asymmetric updating is influenced by the environment 
individuals are operating in. An important feature of this study though was that the source 
of risk in the environment was unrelated to the UBT, yet participants information 
integration in response to bad news in the UBT was enhanced. An interesting question that 
comes out of this is whether biased information integration might also vary according to 
volatility in instances where the source of the threat is related to the structure of the task 
participants are engaged in.  
It has been shown in reinforcement learning contexts that the magnitude of 
learning rates depends in part on the uncertainty of the action value being learnt. 
Specifically, learning rates have been shown to adapt to volatility inherent in the 
environment in which the learning takes place. For instance, in a two armed bandit task, 
when stimulus-outcome associations are learned in stable environments whereby action-
outcome contingencies remain fixed, learning rates are lower compared to when learning 
occurs in a volatile environment in which stimulus-outcome contingencies sporadically 
change (Behrens et al., 2007). High learning rates necessitate that an individual places a 
greater weight on the most recent outcomes which is the best strategy when outcomes are 
unpredictable as unexpected outcomes might signal a change in learned contingencies. But 
in stable environments, a better strategy is to place less weight on unexpected outcomes as 
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these are more likely to be the result of noise in the relationship between actions and 
outcomes rather than a change in the underlying structure of the task. More recently it has 
been shown that individuals high in trait anxiety are worse at adapting their learning rates 
according to the volatility inherent in the environment (Browning et al., 2014).  
 As discussed in Chapter 1, the nature of learning in the UBT is conceptually 
different to that which takes place in reinforcement learning. A key difference is that 
individuals in the UBT see a new event (stimulus) on each trial rather than face the same 
stimuli repeatedly with the opportunity to learn about the properties of this over a 
succession of trials. Nonetheless, the UBT could be adapted to explore whether learning 
from information adapts to the volatility of this information and explore whether valence 
interacts with this adaptation.  
7.2.6 Bias modification  
The findings presented in Chapter 4 suggest that asymmetric information integration is 
not something that is fixed but can potentially be altered under certain conditions. There 
may be instances in which it would be beneficial to try to reduce asymmetric information 
integration such as when it prevents individuals from taking prudent precautionary actions 
(such as eating healthily, depleting retirement savings prudently). Below I briefly outline 
two methods that could be tried as a means of attempting to alter expectations.  
(1) Use of imagination: It has been shown that individuals determine the likelihood of 
an event based in part on how easy it is to picture mentally (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1982; LeDoux, 1992). Asking participants to imagine life events and providing them with 
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cues to enhance how vividly the events are imagined could therefore be used as an 
effective tool for increasing estimates of likelihoods of events occurring in the future. 
(2) Use of reasoning: Studies have shown that contemplating and generating reasons 
for why an outcome might occur increases the perceived likelihood that the event will 
occur (Gregory et al., 1982; Hoch, 1984). Asking participants to select specific reasons for 
why different life events in the future may occur might increase estimates of their 
likelihood of encountering these events.   
7.2.7 The role of genetics in belief updating 
An interesting question for future research is whether genetic factors account for 
individual differences in asymmetric learning? There is good reason to hypothesize that 
genes related to dopaminergic function will predict individual differences in asymmetric 
belief formation. First, enhancing dopaminergic function via the administration of L-
DOPA (L-3,4-dihydroxyphenylalanine) reduces learning from undesirable information 
(Sharot et al., 2012b). Second, within reinforcement-learning tasks, individual differences 
in learning from positive and negative prediction errors has been respectively related to 
genetic polymorphisms of the DARPP32 (dopamine and cAMP-regulated phosphoprotein 
32, also known as PPP1RB) and DRD2 (dopamine receptor D2) genes (Frank, 2004; 
Frank and Hutchison, 2009). DARPP32 encodes an intracellular protein that is 
concentrated in the striatum. This protein, phosphatase 1, is inhibited when 
phosphorylated by dopamine receptor D1 stimulation, thus enabling cortico-striatal 
synaptic plasticity. DRD2 alleles determine dopamine receptor D2 affinity; this is 
primarily expressed by striatopallidal medium spiny neurons that are sensitive to dips of 
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dopamine below baseline. In addition, a polymorphism of the COMT (catechol-O-
methyltrans-ferase) gene, which is associated with individual differences in prefrontal 
dopamine function, has been shown to be related to the in/ability to learn from new 
information that does not fit with a subject's prior beliefs (Doll et al., 2011). COMT 
encodes an enzyme that breaks down extracellular dopamine (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 
2005, 2007), modulating dopamine levels and D1 receptor availability in prefrontal cortex 
(Gogos et al., 1998; Matsumoto et al., 2003; Slifstein et al., 2008), thus possibly 
influencing striatal activity indirectly by affecting prefrontal neurons that project to 
striatum (Krugel et al., 2009). An open question is whether the same genetic 
polymorphisms also predict learning from positive and negative estimation errors for 
motivated beliefs.  
7.2.9 The role of attention in belief updating, depression and rumination 
Dysfunction of executive control is thought to play a key role in depression (Roiser et al., 
2011; Ottowitz et al., 2002) and rumination, a trait closely associated with depression. It is 
proposed that top down executive control plays an important regulatory function, enabling 
individuals to shift their attention away from negative emotional stimuli (Ottowitz et al., 
2002; Joorman, 2010). When this is impaired therefore, it results in increased attention 
towards negative stimuli and leads to the persistence of negative thoughts, both of which 
are observed in rumination and depression (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Armstrong and 
Olatunji 2012; Ellenbogen et al., 2002). Consistent with this, responses in Dorsolateral 
Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC), a key brain region for cognitive control (MacDonald, et al., 
2000; Miller & Cohen, 2001) have been shown to be impaired in patients with depression 
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and rumination (Mayberg et al., 1999; Wagner et al., 2006; Kross et al., 2009; Koster et 
al., 2011). 
Given these findings, a possible mechanism by which healthy individuals are able 
to be less responsive to bad news in the UBT is via attentional processes whereby 
cognitive control is exerted to bias attention away from aversive information (i.e. bad 
news) with the consequence that it is integrated less than good news. Depressed patients in 
contrast due to impaired cognitive control function in prefrontal regions (Mayberg et al., 
1999; Wagner et al., 2006; Kross et al., 2009; Koster et al., 2011) may have less capacity 
to shift attention away from aversive information and integrate it to a greater degree as a 
result. Consistent with this hypothesis, applying TMS to frontal brain regions has been 
shown to increase participants ability to integrate bad news (Sharot et al., 2012a). Strength 
of connectivity between frontal and subcortical brain regions (including limbic structures 
involved in emotional processing such as the amygdala) has also been shown to correlate 
with the extent of update bias with greater connectivity corresponding to less updating 
from bad news (Moutsiana et al., 2015).5 
There are a number of ways future studies could aim to examine whether attention 
modulates integration of information in the UBT. One means of testing this would be to 
examine if increasing executive control in depressed patients, decreases their ability to 
integrate bad news. Previous studies (Siegle et al., 2007; Siegle et al, 2014) have shown 
that getting depressed individuals to complete attention training exercises over a period of 
time (2 weeks) can result in reductions in rumination (measured pre and post training 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Note however that inconsistent with this hypothesis is the lack of differences in emotional ratings found for 
bad news life events between depressed patients and healthy controls in Chapter 3. Although inconsistent, 
this does not rule the hypothesis out however since ratings were taken after the UBT had been completed 
rather than during presentation of the aversive information itself. 
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using a self report questionnaire) possibly as the result of enhanced prefrontal function. 
One approach therefore (along the lines of Siegel et al., 2014) would be to examine 
whether integration of bad news is reduced in depressed patients after they have 
undertaken a period of attention training exercises. Physiological indicators of attention 
such as pupil dilation (e.g. during presentation of negative information) could be used to 
examine if any differences in information integration pre and post attention training can be 
related to markers of DLPFC cognitive control. Pupil dilation has previously been shown 
to vary with DLPFC activity in a cognitive task (Siegel et al., 2011).   
Another approach would be to examine if decreasing executive control in healthy 
individuals increases their ability to integrate bad news. This could be tested by 
introducing a cognitive load manipulation into the UBT (for instance requiring 
participants to remember numbers before and after information presentation). Since 
cognitive load is believed to interfere with cognitive control processes mediated by frontal 
brain regions, if biased updating is the result of top down control, cognitive load ought to 
disrupt the bias. 
7.3 Conclusion 
This thesis has shown the pervasiveness of asymmetric updating by examining it’s 
existence when we consider everyday positive and negative life events (Chapter 6) and 
use different means of classifying information as good or bad (Chapter 5). Humans are 
shown to integrate information into beliefs based on the desirability of beliefs at hand, 
updating beliefs to a greater degree (Chapters 3-6) and more akin to a Bayesian agent 
(Chapter 5) when information presents good news relative to bad news. Errors in 
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prediction are coded differently by the brain and are used to differing degrees to update 
subsequent beliefs (Chapter 3). In clinical depression, this neural coding is enhanced for 
bad news and correspondingly, depressed patients exhibit unbiased updating as a result of 
greater updating from undesirable information.  Just as the bias is shown to dissipate in 
depression (Chapter 3), it also reduced when individuals are faced with a threatening 
environment (Chapter 4). This suggests that the bias is not a fixed means of integrating 
information but one that imposes itself in safe environments with positive effects on our 
affective state (Loewenstein, 2006; Brunnermeier and Parker, 2004; Bracha and Brown, 
2012), health (Taylor et al., 2000), and motivation (Varki, 2009; Bénabou and Tirole, 
2002). 
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